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ABSTRACT
Purpose. As the aged population of this country grows, the U.S. healthcare system will
face increased pressure to provide long-term care services and supports to increasing
numbers of elderly Medicare beneficiaries. Studies have indicated that unmet long-term
care need can lead to increased, unnecessary utilization of the healthcare system, thus
further taxing the Medicare system. Little is known about how type of long-term care, as
well as how long-term care policies—specifically payment policies—affect health care
utilization. The objective of this original dissertation research was to examine the effects
of place of residence (community versus residential long-term care facility) and longterm care payer type (private pay versus Medicaid) on Medicare-funded healthcare
utilization in terms of both risk of potentially preventable hospitalization (PPH) and
Medicare expenditures.
Methods. This study utilized data from the 5% sample of 2013 Medicare claims and
enrollment data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) merged
with data from the Areas Health Resource File (AHRF). A retrospective cohort analysis
examined the healthcare utilization and expenditure patterns of Medicare beneficiaries for
whom, based on clinical and demographic factors, the provision of formal,
comprehensive long-term care would be appropriate, among four cohorts: Medicare-only
beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in longterm care facilities; Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the
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community; and Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care
facilities.
Results. This study found a significantly higher risk of both PPH and having Medicare
expenditures in the top 90th percentile among both Medicare-only long-term care facility
residents and dual eligible community residents as compared to dual eligible long-term
care facility residents, yet Medicare-only long-term care facility residents had
significantly lower per capita Medicare expenditures than did their dual eligible
counterparts residing in long-term care facilities. The results of this study also indicate
that state Medicaid bed hold policies had no statistically significant effect on either risk
of PPH or on Medicare expenditures.
Conclusion. The finding that Medicare-only residents of long-term care facilities are less
expensive to the Medicare system, on average, than their dual eligible long-term care
facility resident peers, yet are more likely to be hospitalized for a preventable condition
and are more likely to be among the most expensive Medicare beneficiaries, could
indicate differential patterns of intensity of medical response to similar clinical conditions
between the two groups. That state Medicaid bed hold policies were not associated with
any of the measures of healthcare utilization in our study seems to suggest that this
Medicaid policy does not provide the perverse incentive toward higher utilization that
some studies suggest.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As baby boomers age, and medical science leads to increased longevity, the
number of elderly Americans in need of long-term care is expected to grow significantly
in the coming years (Schneider & Guralnik, 1990; Laxdawalla & Phillipson, 2002; CBO,
2013). However, as Medicare does not provide reimbursement for long-term care
services and supports (LTCSS) outside of the post-acute setting, and Medicaid coverage
for LTCSS is limited to only those Americans with significant income-based and clinical
needs, many Americans rely solely on informal care for their long-term care support, as
formal long-term care is prohibitively expensive for the majority of elderly individuals in
need of long-term care (CMS, 2015; Wiener, et al., 2013; Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2013; Genworth, 2016).
Research has found that unmet long-term care need is associated with poor health
outcomes and overutilization of the healthcare system (Walsh, E.G., 2012; Sands, et al.,
2006; Kuzuya, et al., 2008; Quail, Wolfson, & Lipman, 2011; Hass, et al., 2015).
Although long-term has been demonstrated to reduce poor health outcomes among frail
elderly individuals, there is also evidence that comprehensiveness of long-term care
affects both health outcomes and healthcare utilization (Kuzuya, 2006; Freedman &
Spillman, 2014; SCAN Foundation, 2011; Wysocki, et al., 2014). However, research has
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also suggested that Medicaid policy can have perverse effects on healthcare utilization—
specifically, a number of studies have suggested that the presence of state Medicaid bed
hold policies encourage the unnecessary hospitalization of Medicaid beneficiaries—and,
to a smaller extent—other beneficiaries, at significant potential costs to the Medicare
system (Intrator, et al., 2007; Intrator, et al., 2009; Grabowski, et al., 2010; Unruh, et al.,
2013).
The objective of this dissertation research was to examine the interplay between
comprehensiveness of long-term care (comparing residents of formal long-term care
facilities to similarly-frail individuals residing in the community) and payor status on
Medicare-funded healthcare utilization, in terms of both potentially preventable
hospitalization (PPH) and Medicare expenditures, utilizing a retrospective cohort analysis
which resulted in the creation of four cohorts: Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the
community; Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities;
Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and
Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities. The
specific aims of the study were: 1) examine the risk of PPH between the four matched
cohorts; and 2) examine median per capita Medicare expenditures as well as risk of being
in the 90th percentile of Medicare expenditures between the four matched cohorts. It is
anticipated that while Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities
will have the lowest risk of PPH, the lowest Medicare expenditures per capita, and the
lowest risk of being in the 90th percentile of Medicare expenditures, dual-eligible
beneficiaries who reside in long-term facilities will be the second lowest group on all

2

measures, as the protective effect of comprehensive long-term care will outweigh the
effects of perverse incentives linked to Medicaid policy.
This dissertation is formatted using the manuscript style: Chapters 4 (Results) and
5 (Conclusions) were replaced with two manuscripts representing the two specific aims
examined. Chapter 2 provides a review of scholarly literature as to the current state of
long-term care policy in America today, and factors associated with differences in
healthcare utilization among individuals in need of long-term care. Chapter 3 provides an
overview of the methodology implemented in this study. Chapter 4 examines the effects
of long-term care facility residency and payor type of risk of PPH among frail elderly
Medicare beneficiaries, while Chapter 5 examines the effects of long-term care facility
residency and payor type on Medicare expenditures among frail elderly Medicare
beneficiaries. Chapter 6 concludes with a highlight of major findings of this dissertation
research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Need for Long-Term Care in America
The National Institutes of Health define long-term care as “care [that] involves a
variety of services designed to meet a person’s health or personal care needs during a
short or long period of time,” and goes on to state that long term care services “help
people live as independently and safely as possible when they can no longer perform
everyday activities on their own” (NIH SeniorHealth, 2015). Essentially, long-term care
is an umbrella term that refers to any care provided with the goal of halting functional
and medical deterioration and assisting frail individuals with daily living needs. Longterm care can be provided in a number of settings, including skilled nursing facilities,
through home visitation programs, in assisted living facilities, or informally by family
members, and can include services that range from assistance with instrumental activities
of daily living (IADLs) (such as grocery shopping and taking care of pets), to assistance
with basic activities of daily living (ADLs) (such as bathing and toileting), to medical
services that span a continuum between simple prescription drug management to
assistance with continuous dialysis (Lawton & Brody, 1969; Katz, 1983; Reddy, et al.,
2007).
In 2012, it was estimated that twelve million Americans were in need of longterm care, (Scan Foundation, 2012), and approximately sixty-three percent of Americans
in need of long-term care are aged 65 and older (Eckenwiler, 2007). The vast majority of
4

older individuals in need of long-term care resided in the community, although nearly
two million lived in nursing homes (Kaye, Harrington, & LaPlante, 2010). As the aged
population in the United States grows due to increased longevity and the aging of the
baby boomers (Schneider & Guralnik, 1990; Lakdawalla & Philipson, 2002), if the
proportion of the aged population in need of long-term care remains static, 9.6 million
individuals aged 65 and older will need long-term care in 2030, rising to over 14 million
in 2050 (CBO, 2013).
Estimates for odds of requiring long-term care during one’s lifetime vary, and
take into consideration population-level ADL impairment rates and historical patterns of
long-term care utilization. The most widely-used model of long-term care utilization is
the “Robinson care status transition matrix,” which employs a Continuous-Time Markov
Chain model using data from the 1982, 1984, and 1989 National Long-Term Care
Surveys, and has been used in combination with data from the 1985 National Nursing
Home Survey to estimate a lifetime risk of need for nursing home care of 39%
(Robinson, 2002; Brown & Finkelstein, 2006). However, recent research using more
recent data from the Health and Retirement Study suggests that the Robinson model
underestimates the need for long-term care by failing to account for nursing home stays
that are relatively short—for example, data such as that in the National Long-Term Care
Surveys that is collected at one time point per wave fails to catch the many individuals
who live in the community at time point one, enter a nursing home between time one and
time two, yet either die or are transferred back to the community prior to time two (Hurd,
Michaud, & Rohwedder, 2014). Accounting for these “short-stay” nursing home residents
through the use of exit interviews, researchers have found a lifetime risk of need for
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nursing home care of nearly 58% (Id.). A study conducted using data from the Center for
Retirement Research found a similar lifetime risk, with 44% of men estimated to require
nursing home care during their lifetime, and 58% of women (Friedberg, et al., 2014).
Comprehensive long-term care that fully meets the needs of recipients can be
difficult to achieve through informal care alone, but access to formal long-term care can
be prohibitively expensive for many Americans. The average cost of a one month stay in
an assisted living facility is $3,293, while the average cost of one month of nursing home
care is $6,235 for a semi-private room (DHS, 2016). Adult day care services—which
allow working caregivers a place to leave their loved ones in need of long-term care
while they are at work—cost $67 per day, which is considerably less expensive than the
alternative of in-home health aide care, which costs approximately $21 per hour, or $168
per eight-hour day (DHS, 2016).
Provision of and Payment for Long-Term Care
Private Long-Term Care Insurance
Despite the statistics regarding likelihood of need for long-term care in one’s
lifetime, and the high costs of formal long-term care, only ten percent of individuals over
age 50 have purchased long-term care insurance (Andrews, 2010). Much research has
been conducted into better understanding private long-term care insurance uptake, with
much of the evidence pointing to a fundamental problem with the way that consumers
perceive long-term care insurance. Research has shown that consumers do not view longterm care insurance as insurance, but rather as an investment—in essence, consumers
view payment of long-term care insurance premiums as a waste of money unless they
actually use long-term care, and so are often only incentivized to purchase it if they feel
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confident that they will actually need long-term care (Gottlieb & Mitchell, 2015).
Insurance companies are aware of this potential adverse selection problem, and adjust for
it by increasing the premiums for long-term care insurance based on a number of factors
that would indicate higher risk of long-term care utilization—the primary factor being
age (Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006; Sloan & Norton, 1997). For instance, while the U.S.
government cites the average cost of a long-term care policy as approximately $2,207 per
year for five years of coverage (DHS, 2016), in reality, in South Carolina, this level of
premium would be accurate for a healthy sixty-year-old male, and would provide a daily
maximum coverage of $150 per day—while nursing home daily rates average $190 per
day in the state (Genworth, 2016; Genworth, 2015). A healthy seventy-year-old male
who wishes to purchase coverage of $200 per day in South Carolina will need to spend
approximately $7,000 per year in premiums, while an individual in poor health or in need
of assistance with multiple ADLs will pay considerably higher premiums, and most likely
be subject to a waiting period before benefits accrue (Genworth 2016; Genworth 2015).
These supply-side issues have been examined in depth, with Brown and
Finkelstein finding an average 18 percent load factor for long-term care carried by a 65year-old until death—meaning that for every dollar of premium paid, the beneficiary will
only receive 82 cents worth of long-term care benefits—which compares unfavorably to
the average load of 8 percent on health insurance (Brown & Finkelstein, 2004;
Newhouse, 2002). Brown and Finkelstein also join the researchers who cite limited
benefits as a potential explanation of low long-term care insurance uptake, yet assert that
neither high costs nor limited benefits can truly explain the relative failure of private
long-term care to gain a hold in the market, citing stark differences in actuarial fairness
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between males and females (with females actually averaging favorable a load of -4%), as
well as the availability of comprehensive coverage that consumers choose not to purchase
(Id.) Instead, Brown and Finkelstein point to demand-side factors—particularly the
existence of informal care and Medicaid as substitutes for privately insuring for potential
long-term care needs (Brown & Finkelstein, 2008).
Medicaid as a Payer for Long-Term Care
Many Americans seem to believe—often mistakenly—that they can rely on
Medicaid as an insurer of last resort to provide coverage for any long-term care needs
that might arise (Brown, Goda, & McGarry, 2012; Brown & Finkelstein, 2008). In
reality, although Medicaid is the primary payer of long-term care in this country, strict
income, asset, and medical needs standards set by individual states govern eligibility for
Medicaid coverage for long-term care. Although income eligibility standards vary greatly
from state to state, a number of states require that individuals aged 65 or older either be
eligible to receive benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program
(which would equate to an income of no more than $710 per month in 2013 for an
individual and $1,066 for a married couple) or have income below the federal poverty
level (which in 2013 was set at $957.50 per month for an individual and $1,292.50 per
month for a married couple in 2013) in order to be eligible for full Medicaid coverage
(Social Security Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, 2012; Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2013).
Individuals who do not purchase long-term care insurance, and who cannot selfinsure, yet require long-term care can attempt to obtain Medicaid-funded long-term care
coverage through three avenues: they may choose to engage in what is referred to in the
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world of trust and estate law as “Medicaid planning”; they may spend down assets and
income on long-term care until their assets and income reach the level of Medicaid
eligibility; or they may find an alternative means to receiving long-term care services.
The first method— “Medicaid planning”—is highly controversial, as it allows individuals
to shelter their assets via a number of legal maneuvers including transfers to spouses,
transfers to caregiving children, creation of a number of different types of trusts, and, in
some cases, divorce in order to become eligible for Medicaid without spending down
assets (Takacs & McGuffey, 2002; Kapp, 2006). Through utilization of this often
ethically questionable planning method, individuals who could afford to finance their
long-term care for some period of time are instead able to have the necessary long-term
care paid in full through the Medicaid system. The federal government has attempted to
quell the use of such legal loopholes to game the public long-term care financing system
by requiring a 5-year lookback period on many types of asset transfers, while still
allowing for transfers designed to leave the spouse of a long-term care recipient with
income and assets on which to live, with questionable success (Reif, 2010; Baird, Hurd,
& Rohwedder, 2014).
The second option available to those who are in need of long-term care, and hope
to obtain coverage through Medicaid, is the income and asset spend-down option.
Essentially, if a would-be Medicaid beneficiary is in need of comprehensive long-term
care, he or she can begin receiving care by paying out of pocket, and continue to do so
until his or her income and assets are diminished to the extent that they become eligible
for Medicaid (Wiener, et al., 2013). This option provides allowances for a communitydwelling spouse’s monthly maintenance and housing needs as well as total resource and
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home equity allowances for such spouse (CMS, 2016). The income and asset standards
set forth by the federal government to protect community-dwelling spouses often do not
rise to the level of income and assets that would be sheltered under Medicaid planning
methods, but do ensure in nearly all cases that the community-dwelling spouse will not
be impoverished if the decision is made to spend-down assets in anticipation of
qualification for Medicaid-funded long-term care. In 2013, community-dwelling spouses
in all states but Alaska and Hawaii could retain a maximum of $2,898 for minimum
monthly maintenance, $581.63 for housing, and total resources of $115,920 in nonhousing assets as well as $802,000 in home equity resources (CMS, 2013).
Medicare’s Role in Long-Term Care
By design, Medicare does not cover long term care, instead providing coverage
for hospital inpatient and skilled nursing facility care in acute cases and cases in which a
determination has been made that care is necessary for a patient’s condition to improve or
to prevent or slow a decline in condition, as well as home health care in cases in which a
physician has certified that the care is medically necessary to treat an illness or injury,
and hospice care in cases in which a patient has a life expectancy of less than six months
and has chosen to discontinue curative care (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
2015; Jimmo v. Sebelius, 2013). Medicare also covers provider services and visits,
surgery, durable medical equipment, lab tests, and prescription drugs (CMS, 2015).
While it would seem that the requirement that skilled nursing care be necessary to
prevent or slow a decline in condition could lend itself to considerable long term care
coverage for those who need it, in reality, Medicare places additional conditions on the
payment for such services. Beneficiaries hoping for Medicare financing of long term care
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in a nursing facility must: (1) have had a recent hospital stay of at least three consecutive
days; (2) be admitted to a Medicare-certified skilled nursing facility within thirty days of
that hospital stay; and (3) be in need of skilled care, such as skilled nursing or therapy, as
opposed to help with activities of daily living alone (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 2014). Once these three conditions are satisfied, Medicare will only
cover one hundred percent of a beneficiary’s costs during the beneficiary’s first twenty
days in the skilled nursing facility, followed by any expenses over $140.00 per day for
the next eighty days, and will not provide any coverage for skilled nursing facility stays
in excess of 100 days per year (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2014).
Similarly, although in theory Medicare could be understood to provide long term
care services in the form of home health care, coverage for this care, too, is time-limited
as well as subject to the condition that the care provided be “medically necessary” in the
form of intermittent skilled nursing care, physical therapy, speech-language pathology
services, and/or continued occupational therapy to treat an illness or injury (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). Medicare specifically excludes from coverage
personal care and help with activities of daily living in the absence of illness or injury
that requires skilled nursing care (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015).
Informal Care
Due in large part of the high costs of formal long-term care, two thirds of older
Americans who require long-term care receive this care exclusively through informal,
unpaid care provided by family and friends, with an additional twenty-five percent
receiving care through a patchwork of informal and formal care (most of whom receive
some formal home health services in addition to care provided by loved ones) (Doty,
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2010). Less than ten percent of individuals over 65 who are in need of long-term care
receive all of their care through a formal long-term care provider (i.e., through a
residential care facility) (Id.).
While informal caregiving decreases the burden on publicly-funded insurers of
long-term care, and is often regarded as an economical alternative to paying for these
services out of pocket, it too comes with steep costs. To begin, informal long-term care
places high physiological, emotional, and financial burdens on informal caregivers.
Caregiving has been shown to cause chronic stress, and thus to lead to a number of poor
physiological and mental health effects (Schulz & Sherwood, 2008; Vitaliano, Zhang, &
Scanlan, 2003). Specifically, caregivers have been shown to have lowered immune
function and cognition, and increased inflammation and cell aging compared to noncaregivers (Fonareva & Oken, 2014), as well as significantly increased rates of
depression and other mental stress (Pinquart & Sorensen, 2003).
The overburdening of caregivers not only harms caregivers themselves, but also
threatens the health and well-being of their charges. Studies show that increasing levels
of personal and role-based caregiver burden lead to increased hospitalizations and allcause mortality among frail elderly care recipients (Kuzuya, et al., 2011), though there is
evidence that caregiver burden has little to no effect on frail older individual’s utilization
of physician outpatient services (Reckrey, et al., 2013). Whether such findings may
indicate a tendency of overburdened caregivers to forego preventive and non-acute
ameliorative care services, thus leading to acute care admissions for ambulatory-care
sensitive conditions (ACSCs), is yet to be determined. As informal caregiving is the
primary method of provision of long-term care in this country, the potential effects of this
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form of care on health outcomes and utilization patterns of those receiving care is a
policy concern.
Substitution of Care
For the millions of frail elderly who are in need of long-term care, yet receive
either no such care or, more likely, some level of informal care that may leave them with
unmet need, substitution of care is a concern. Put simply, if long-term needs are left
unmet (or if caregiver strain is such that needs are in danger of not being met), one of two
scenarios are likely to unfold: either alternative means of meeting these needs must be
found, or these frail individuals’ health states will decline in ways that lead to preventable
health system utilization, often in the form of potentially preventable hospitalizations
(PPH). As virtually all Americans aged 65 and older have either free or low cost health
care through Medicare, the most likely source of payment for either of these scenarios
would seem to be Medicare.
Recent research suggests that the former scenario—that of seeking Medicare
payment for long-term care services in the absence of another form of long-term care
coverage—does in fact occur with regard to Medicare Part B home health claims
(Avalere Health, 2008). The SCAN Foundation has found that, among Medicare
beneficiaries with at least one ADL need, per capita Part B home health care spending is
nearly twice as high as per capita Part A home health care spending ($812 vs 442 in
2005) (Id.). Given that Part A home health referrals (i.e., post-acute referrals) are timelimited, while Part B home health referrals (which originate from a physician outside of
an acute setting) are not, these researchers argue that physicians are referring patients in
need of long-term care to home health agencies through the Medicare Part B mechanism,
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thus using the Medicare system as a substitute payer of long-term care services. Such
substitution can only occur with respect to Part B-funded home health services, as
nursing facility services and Part A-funded services are time-limited. Similar costshifting has also been shown to originate as overt state Medicaid program “Medicare
maximization” policies that encourage home health providers to seek out ways to bill
Medicare, rather than Medicaid, for home health services (Grabowski, 2007; USGAO,
1997).
The potential for the latter scenario—that of overutilization of the health care
system—arises when unmet long-term care need precipitates a decline in health, leading
to PPH and other inefficient health system utilization. While the primary focus of longterm care is in providing assistance with ADLs and IADLs, formal long-term care has
also proven to be effective in helping to reduce negative health outcomes among
recipients. Unmet long-term care needs have consistently been demonstrated to lead to
poor health outcomes—individuals with unmet need with regard to assistance with ADLs
and IADLs are considerably more likely than their counterparts whose ADL and IADL
needs are met to have a potentially preventable hospitalization, to visit the Emergency
Department, and to have a large number of physician visits (Walsh, E.G., 2012; Sands, et
al., 2006; Xu, et al., 2012; Kuzuya et al., 2008; Quail, Wolfson, & Lippman, 2011; Hass,
et al., 2015). Frail elderly individuals with unmet long-term care needs are also at a
greater risk of death compared to similarly-situated frail elderly individuals whose longterm care needs are appropriately met (Kuzuya, 2006). Reasons for these negative
outcomes include a lack of assistance with managing chronic medical conditions (Allen
& Mor, 1997), a lack of assistance with medication management (Kuzuya, 2008)
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increased likelihood of accidental injury (LaPlante, et al., 2004; Komisar, Feder, &
Kasper, 2005), and increased rates of depression in the population of frail elderly who
have unmet long-term care needs (Allen & Mor, 1997), which has been shown to put
older adults at increased risk of subsequent physical decline (Penninx, et al., 1998).
Although long-term care in general has been shown to reduce poor health
outcomes among individuals in need of such care, there is further evidence that the
location and type of the long-term care provided play a role in health outcomes and
healthcare utilization. Frail elderly adults who receive comprehensive adult day care
services have been shown to have considerably lower mortality and healthcare utilization
rates than their counterparts who also live in the community but do not receive such
comprehensive services (Kuzuya, 2006). One recent study has found that rates of adverse
consequences associated with unmet long-term care need (including self-soiling, inability
to bathe, inability to properly manage medications, going without food, and missing
health care appointments) were considerably higher among frail elderly who received
paid home health services than among similarly situated frail elderly who resided in
nursing homes (Freedman & Spillman, 2014). Research conducted by the SCAN
Foundation has demonstrated that annual per capita Medicare spending in 2006 for older
Americans with disabilities was considerably higher among those beneficiaries who
reside in the community ($18,308) compared to those who resided in assisted living
facilities ($14,001) and skilled nursing facilities ($14,594) (SCAN Foundation, 2011).
Wysocki, et al., have found that elderly users of formal home and community based longterm care services were at increased risk of both potentially preventable hospitalizations
and non-potentially preventable hospitalizations compared to elderly nursing home
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residents with similar levels of physical and medical decline (Wysocki, et al., 2014).
These findings seem to indicate that unmet long-term care need and associated health
decline is greater among individuals who live in the community than it is among
individuals who receive formal long-term care in residential facilities, which supports the
theory that individuals who must rely on informal care for the bulk of their long-term
care support will be more likely to utilize the health care system to address health issues
that may have been avoidable with proper long-term care services and supports.
Why it Matters
If it is indeed true that individuals with unmet long-term care needs will have
poorer health outcomes and higher rates of health system utilization than individuals with
similar levels of functional decline and chronic condition morbidity who have no unmet
long-term care needs, and it is also the case that comprehensive, formal long-term care
leads to fewer unmet needs than informal long-term care, at least with regard to patients
with a certain level of functional and health decline, then it seems that our current system
of classifying long-term care as separate from health care might be ripe for reevaluation.
Currently, Medicare only provides coverage on a limited basis for long-term care, much
of which must be post-acute care, and all of which must be tangential to necessary
medical care. This has created a situation in which formal long-term care services are
only available to individuals who were already eligible for Medicaid by virtue of lowincome status, those wealthy enough to afford to pay out of pocket—either directly for
services or for long-term care insurance, those sophisticated enough and motivated to
engage in Medicaid planning, or those who engage in a spend-down of assets. While the
rationale for this seems to be that long-term care is something outside of health care—a
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luxury, perhaps—what we are learning about the effects of long-term care (or lack
thereof) on health seem to indicate that this theory might be misguided. As our nation
looks to preventive care as a way to combat rising health care costs by forestalling the
development of disease, we might also do well to consider the potential role of
comprehensive long-term care in reducing poor health outcomes, and thus reducing
health care utilization.
Medicaid Policy and Health Care Utilization
In theory, to determine whether publicly-funded long-term care services do, in
fact, reduce health system utilization we need only examine the effect of Medicaid
generosity in long-term care services on health care system utilization among individuals
eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid. If health system utilization is significantly
higher among similarly situated Medicare-only beneficiaries who do not receive formal
long-term care than it is among dual eligible beneficiaries who receive formal, Medicaidfunded long-term care, this could indicate a need to reevaluate current policies as to the
public provision of funding for long-term care.
Although Medicaid generosity indices have been used previously to examine the
effects of Medicaid policy on various social and health-related outcomes, these indices
typically focus on the effects of Medicaid generosity on non-elderly adults or children.
We have found only one instance of utilization of a Medicaid long-term care generosity
index: a 2010 study by Fossett and Burke utilized an index of Medicaid program
generosity developed by Park (Park, 2007) to examine the interaction of multiple state
long-term care policies on long-term care spending (Fossett & Burke, 2010). This
Medicaid program generosity index was constructed using factor analysis of eight
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variables: (1) nursing home payment per diem; (2) nursing home bed ratio per 1,000
elderly aged 65 and over; (3) Medicaid payments to elderly nursing home residents aged
65 and over; (4) ratio of Medicaid payments to nursing homes to private payments; (5)
1915(c) HCBS waiver expenditure per elderly Medicaid enrollee; (6) Medicaid payments
for home health per elderly enrollee; (7) percentage of nursing home residents to the
elderly population aged 65 years and older; and (8) percentage of the aged Medicaid
enrollees to the elderly population aged 65 years and older (Id.).
While this index may provide an effective means of studying demand-side aspects
of Medicaid long-term care policy, it cannot be used to answer the question of whether
increasing publicly-funded long-term care coverage can decrease unnecessary health care
utilization. One reason that we cannot use this model for our study is the dearth of factors
that measure the generosity of long-term care eligibility—that is, how easy it is for
individuals who need long-term care coverage to meet Medicaid long-term care
eligibility requirements. This issue is easily surmountable—indeed, Park accounted for
this problem in his dissertation work, controlling in his models for presence or absence of
different state-level eligibility programs and income standards (Park, ibid).
However, a larger problem with the use of a Medicaid generosity index to
determine the effects of Medicaid long-term care coverage on health system utilization
emerges. One could reasonably hypothesize that states with more generous Medicaid
eligibility policies—and that also have accessible paths to Medicaid-covered long-term
care service and support obtainment—should have lower Medicare-funded health care
utilization per beneficiary given what we know about long-term care’s ability to decrease
unnecessary health care utilization and poor health outcomes. However, this hypothesis
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fails to account for the existence of market forces that both precipitate market responses
and create unintended perverse incentives in the Medicare and Medicaid long-term care
coverage systems. These responses to the market on one hand impede access to long-term
care for Medicaid beneficiaries, and on the other actually incentivize the utilization of
Medicare-funded acute care services by dual eligible beneficiaries receiving Medicaidfunded long-term care.
The first market response reflects the higher rates that long-term care providers
can receive from virtually any payer other than Medicaid, which results in Medicaidfunded long-term care consumers being viewed as the least desirable additions to the
patient panel. In 2012, of the 15,652 nursing homes nationwide that accepted Medicaid
beneficiaries, 14,332 were also certified to accept individuals whose care was funded by
Medicare (CMS, 2013(b)). As the average margin on Medicare payments to nursing
homes in this country has been over 10 percent since the turn of the last century (CMS,
2013(b)), while the average shortfall on Medicaid payments has consistently been nearly
10 percent (CMS, 2013(b)), nursing home and home health administrators often view
Medicaid-funded long-term care recipients as the least attractive consumers of care
(Reschovsky, 1996). Nursing homes in particular compete for higher paying residents,
hoping to fill as many beds as possible with Medicare patients (Zinn, et al., 2007;
Gleckman, 2013). By prioritizing admissions of Medicare beneficiaries and private pay
consumers of care over Medicaid beneficiaries, nursing facilities—and to a lesser extent,
home health agencies—reduce the ability of Medicaid-funded frail older adults to access
necessary care—particularly those Medicaid beneficiaries who are high acuity, as these
individuals would represent steeper losses for providers than would low acuity
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beneficiaries (Feng, et al., 2006; Miller, et al., 2009). Thus, we cannot assume that more
generous Medicaid long-term care coverage necessarily correlates with sufficient access
to needed long-term care services.
The second market response occurs in response to Medicaid bed-hold policies,
which have been adopted by thirty-six states and the District of Columbia to provide
continuity of nursing home placement in the event that a resident must be hospitalized
(National Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center, 2012). These policies provide
Medicaid reimbursement for beds that are temporarily empty due to the hospitalization of
a Medicaid patient, in return for the facility’s reservation of the bed in anticipation of the
beneficiary’s return. The generosity of Medicaid bed-hold policies vary significantly by
state, with some states requiring a minimum nursing home occupancy rate to employ the
bed-hold reimbursement payments while others do not, and some states allowing for only
four days of reimbursed bed-hold, while others do not set a maximum number of days
during which a bed can be held (Id.).
Bed-hold policies were put in place to protect Medicaid beneficiaries by
preventing the loss of their beds to more lucrative Medicare and private-pay patients. As
Intrator, et al., have pointed out, bed-hold policies have also created a powerful perverse
incentive: if the marginal profit of holding a bed under Medicaid-reimbursed bed-hold
policy is greater than the marginal profit of keeping the Medicaid patient in the facility,
the facility has every incentive to hospitalize the Medicaid beneficiary (Intrator, et al.,
2007). Indeed, states with bed-hold policies of at least average generosity have been
shown to have significantly higher rates of transfer from nursing homes to hospitals than
states without bed-hold policies (Id.; Intrator, et al., 2009).
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As these bed-hold policies only apply to nursing home residents whose long-term
care services are covered by Medicaid, one would assume that nursing facilities are apt to
hospitalize Medicaid beneficiaries at higher rates than their Medicare-funded and private
pay counterparts. Grabowski, et al., partially refute this theory in a study that
demonstrates the tendency of Medicare-funded short-term stay skilled nursing facility
residents in states with generous bed-hold policies to be hospitalized at higher rates than
their counterparts residing in states without generous bed-hold policies (Grabowski, et al.,
2010). While Grabowski and his colleagues do make the point that Medicaid bed-hold
policies likely affect the culture of long-term care facilities as it pertains to
hospitalization decisions for all residents, regardless of payer, their study did not examine
relative hospitalization rates between those whose care was funded by Medicaid and
those whose care was funded by Medicare. While Medicaid bed-hold policies may lead to
spillover effects in the non-Medicaid population of long-term care residents, there is
evidence that payer status does indeed interact with these policies to contribute to
increased rates of hospitalization among Medicaid beneficiaries (Unruh, et al., 2013).
The final market response with potential to affect Medicaid long-term care
beneficiaries’ utilization of the health care system stems from the interplay between dual
eligibility and Medicare’s payment for post-acute care services in long-term care
facilities. Medicaid long-term care beneficiaries who are also eligible for Medicare are
typically eligible for more lucrative Medicare-funded post-acute care once they return to
their original long-term care facility following a hospital stay of at least three days. This
creates incentives for nursing homes to hospitalize Medicaid beneficiaries unnecessarily
in order not only to avoid utilizing nursing home resources to care for a sick patient, but
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also to ensure considerably higher reimbursement rates for care provided as the patient
recovers from his or her illness (Grabowski, 2007; Ouslander & Berenson, 2011).
Although research into the effects of Medicaid bed-hold policies on health
outcomes of Medicaid long-term care beneficiaries as compared to similarly situated
long-term care recipients financed through other payment sources is sparse—and even
less research has been conducted specifically into the effects of post-acute Medicare
payments for Medicaid long-term care beneficiaries—research into the effects of state
Medicaid policy on Medicaid beneficiary outcomes has demonstrated that these policies
create incentives for providers to transfer Medicaid beneficiaries at significantly higher
rates than their non-Medicaid beneficiary counterparts (Konetzka, Spector, & Limcangco,
2008). Individuals whose long-term care is funded by Medicaid have higher rates of
hospitalization for ambulatory care sensitive conditions (Konetzka, Spector, & Shaffer,
2004; Spector, et al., 2013), as well as for all-cause hospitalizations (Intrator, Zinn, &
Mor, 2004).
Study Purpose
Due to the existence of the market forces described above in the Medicaid longterm care system, we cannot assume that individuals who receive Medicaid-financed
long-term care services will utilize Medicare-financed health care in the same way as
individuals whose long-term care is funded through non-Medicaid payers. However, even
if the current evidence of policy-driven patterns of increased health system utilization by
Medicaid-funded long-term care recipients holds, this does not necessarily indicate that
Medicaid-funded long-term care recipients do not still benefit from long-term care
overall, or that Medicare-financed hospitalizations are not still reduced in this population
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as compared to similarly situated individuals who reside in the community. Just as studies
have shown the positive effects of appropriate long-term care provision that meets the
needs of its recipients, it may be that the perverse incentives that plague Medicaid-funded
long-term care are outweighed by the positive overall effect of better care and better
coordination of care that comes with receipt of formal long-term care.
The objective of this retrospective cohort analysis was to examine potentially
preventable hospitalization (PPH) and Medicare expenditure patterns of Medicare
beneficiaries for whom, based on clinical, functional, and demographic factors, the
provision of formal, comprehensive long-term care would be appropriate. The study was
conducted using information from Medicare claims, available from the Research Data
Assistance Center (ResDAC). This study focused on utilization and expenditure patterns
among Medicare beneficiaries based on (1) long-term stay in a skilled nursing facility
and (2) dual eligibility status. Thus, we compared rates of PPH, as well as Medicare
expenditure patterns, between the following four groups:
(1) Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community;
(2) Medicare-only beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care
facility;
(3) Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries, residing in the community; and
(4) Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a
residential care facility.
Study subjects were selected based on their clinical, functional, and demographic
similarity to ensure similar levels of long-term care need across the four groups. Two
specific aims were addressed in this study: the first examined differences in risk of PPH
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between the four cohorts while controlling for person-level characteristics that influence
risk of hospitalization and overall healthcare utilization as well as state Medicaid bed
hold policies, which have been demonstrated to influence risk of hospitalization among
Medicaid beneficiaries who reside in long-term care facilities, while the second examined
average per capita Medicare expenditures between the four cohorts as well as average
total annual Medicare charges between the four cohorts and risk of being in the 90th
percentile—or most “high cost”—Medicare beneficiaries. To that end, the following were
the aims of this study:
(1) Examine the risk of PPH between four matched cohorts: Medicare-only
beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only beneficiaries who are
long-stay residents of a residential care facility; Medicare/Medicaid dualeligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid
dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care
facility.
Hypothesis 1: Medicare-only beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a
residential care facility will have the lowest risk of PPH, followed by
Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a
residential care facility. Both groups receiving formal, residential long-term
care will have lower PPH risks than their counterparts with similar levels of
long-term care need who reside in the community.
(2) Examine average per capita Medicare expenditures and risk of being a “high
cost” Medicare beneficiary between four matched cohorts: Medicare-only
beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only beneficiaries who are
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long-stay residents of a residential care facility; Medicare/Medicaid dualeligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid
dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care
facility.
Hypothesis 2: Medicare-only beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a
residential care facility will have the lowest Medicare expenditures, and be the
least at risk of being a “high cost” Medicare beneficiary followed by
Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a
residential care facility. Both groups receiving formal, residential long-term
care will have lower average Medicare expenditures than their counterparts
with similar levels of long-term care need who reside in the community.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Study Design
This study utilized a retrospective cohort design using 2013 Medicare claims data,
using state and county FIPS code to merge the Medicare claims data with AHRF data. In
addition, information as to Medicaid bed-hold policies by state, authored by The National
Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center (National Long-Term Care Ombudsman
Resource Center, 2012), was merged with the study data set.
Theoretical Model
Our selection of matching variables was based in part on the Gelberg-Andersen
Behavioral Model for Vulnerable Populations (Gelberg, Andersen, & Leake, 2000).
Andersen’s model emphasizes the impact of both environmental and population variables
on an individual’s health system utilization. In Andersen’s model, environmental factors
influence three major forms of population characteristics that themselves affect each
other, with predisposing characteristics (i.e., demographic, social, and cultural factors)
affecting one’s enabling resources (i.e., financial and organizational factors), which in
turn affect need for health services (both perceived need and evaluated need) (Babitsch,
Gohl, & von Lengerke, 2012). In turn, both perceived and evaluated need affect health
behavior in the form of personal health practices and use of health services, which affects
health outcomes (Gelberg, Andersen, & Leake, 2000).
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We posited that in the population of frail Medicare beneficiaries, predisposing
characteristics (e.g., age, sex, and race/ethnicity) affect enabling resources (in this model
the enabling resources are comprised of the two statuses that make up our key
independent variable: Medicaid eligibility and method of long-term care provision). To
begin, age affects method of long-term care provision in that the older a Medicare
beneficiary is, the more likely they are to need formal long-term care, as factors such as
widowhood and compounding of functional and clinical decline increase with age
(Branch & Jette, 1982; Spillman & Lubitz, 2000). At the same time, age also affects
ability to self-insure, as long-term care insurance premiums increase significantly with
age (AALTCI, 2016). Sex affects enabling resources as men are more likely to have
informal long-term care provided by wives (Navaie-Waliser, Spriggs, & Feldman, 2002;
Lakdawalla & Philipson, 1998). Race and ethnicity affect enabling resources due to
differential cultural norms between whites, African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians as
to the burden of providing comprehensive informal care for an elderly relative,
perceptions of duty to do so, as well as potential effects of discrimination on access to
formal long-term care (Wallace, et al., 1997; Dilworth-Anderson, Williams, & Gibson,
2002; Bradley, et al., 2002).
In turn, we believed that an individual’s status as to enabling resources (here,
these two characteristics—insurance status and method of provision of long-term care—
make up our independent variable of interest) would affect their (or their caregiver’s)
ability to ensure that their long-term care needs are met in full. We further posited that
individuals whose needs are not met through long-term care that is appropriately
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comprehensive/responsive to their functional and health needs would be more likely to
have these unmet needs manifest in PPH.
While we acknowledge the environmental effects of the health system and public
policy on population characteristics, these effects are not integral to our current study.
However, we have modified Andersen’s model to account for the effects of external
policies on risk of hospitalization. First, residents who live in counties with a higher
number of hospital beds per 1000 population, as well as residents who live in counties
with practice patterns that are associated with higher rates of hospitalization, will be more
likely to be hospitalized generally (Fisher & Wennberg, 2003). Further, research has
shown that Medicaid beneficiaries receiving formal, residential long-term care are at
increased risk of hospitalization compared to non-Medicaid beneficiaries in the same
long-term care facilities and with the same level of functional decline and health status
due to the presence of perverse incentives caused by Medicaid long-term care policy
(Wysocki, et al., 2014).
Institutional Review Board (IRB)
Approval from the University of South Carolina IRB was granted on March 24,
2016. The study was categorized as “exemption status,” as de-identified secondary data
was utilized for this study.
Data Sources
This study utilized data from the 5% sample of 2013 Medicare claims and
enrollment data, available from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
through the Research Data Assistance Center (ResDAC). ResDAC is a consortium of
researchers that house CMS data. The CMS data utilized for this study consisted of
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Research Identifiable Files. A total of four 2013 Medicare claims and enrollment data
files obtained from ResDac will be used: The Base A/B/C/D segment of the Master
Beneficiary Summary File; the Chronic Conditions segment of the Master Beneficiary
Summary File; the MedPAR All file; and the Medicare Carrier Claims file.
The Base A/B/C/D segment was used to identify beneficiary’s state and county of
residence, as well as demographic characteristics and dual eligibility status. The Base
A/B/C/D segment includes information as to beneficiary enrollment, including but not
limited to ZIP Code (to determine county of residence), date of birth, date of death,
race/ethnicity, sex, and dual enrollment status. The Chronic Conditions segment was used
to identify presence or absence of one or more chronic conditions, as well as to identify
whether or not a beneficiary had a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or other form of senility. The
Chronic Conditions segment contains information as to presence or absence of 27 distinct
chronic conditions. The Carrier Claims File was used to determine location of residence
of the Medicare beneficiary, as it is the only file available to us that allows for
discernment of beneficiary place of residence based on the place of service of physician
claims. We also used the Carrier Claims file to isolate primary, secondary, and tertiary
diagnoses (if available) made by a physician during the beneficiary’s first physician visit
of the study year. Finally, the MedPAR All file was used to analyze incidence of
hospitalization among beneficiaries. The Medicare claims files contain Medicare
utilization and expenditure data on an estimated 3 million Medicare beneficiaries for the
year 2013.
In addition to these Medicare claims files, the Health Resources and Services
(HRSA) Area Health Resource File (AHRF) was used to determine the rurality of
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Medicare beneficiaries based on the Urban Influence Code tied to their county of
residence.
A compilation of Medicaid bed-hold policies by state, authored by The National
Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center, was used to create a dichotomous
variable for presence or absence of state bed-hold policies (National Long-Term Care
Ombudsman Resource Center, 2012).
Study Sample
The study sample included four cohorts of Medicare beneficiaries whose ADL
needs, chronic condition status, and demographic characteristics made them likely to
benefit from long-term care services and supports, distinguished by place of residence
(community vs. residential care facility), as well as Medicaid long-term care coverage
status (eligible for Medicaid-covered long-term care vs. not eligible). The four cohorts
were: Medicare-only beneficiaries, residing in the community; Medicare-only
beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care facility; Medicare/Medicaid
dual-eligible beneficiaries, residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid dualeligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care facility. Residential
care facilities were defined for the purposes of this study as facilities in which individuals
reside in order to receive some level of long-term care services, and will include assisted
living facilities, group homes, skilled nursing facilities, and nursing facilities, as
designated in the Medicare Carrier Claims file. As there is no definitive means of
differentiating long-stay residence in a residential care facility in the Medicare claims
data, long-stay residence was defined as having two separate Medicare claims linked to a
residential care facility in the Carrier Claims file as place of service that originated at
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dates of at least 90 days apart. This method approximated that of Intrator, et al., who
employed a similar method, using Medicare-required MDS assessments at intervals of at
least 90 days when studying Medicare claims data (Intrator, et al., 2007).
Exclusions
In order to arrive at our study sample, we first excluded from the original sample
of approximately 3 million Medicare beneficiaries any individuals who are under age 65,
thus removing the majority of Medicare beneficiaries who became eligible for Medicare
due to a diagnosis of ESRD or other clinical diagnosis, leaving a population that has aged
into Medicare eligibility. We also excluded any beneficiaries who turned 65 during the
study year to ensure that each beneficiary studied has an entire year of potential claims
available for analysis. Further, while the Medicare claims files include Medicare
beneficiaries who participate in Medicare Advantage and other Managed Care
Organization options, claims data as to these individuals is incomplete, necessitating our
exclusion of this population from our study as well.
Creation of Study Cohorts
To ensure, to the best of our ability, that the study population consists only of
Medicare beneficiaries who due to functional, health, and demographic factors are likely
to need long-term care, we first created a subset of Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible
beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care facility. We then employed
a validated matching methodology, with this subset as our reference/case group,
ultimately choosing to undertake further analysis utilizing the matching methodology that
provides the three control groups (Medicare-only beneficiaries, residing in the
community; Medicare-only beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care

31

facility; and Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries, residing in the community).
Thus, our final study population included only those beneficiaries who are similar to the
Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of residential
care facilities in terms of functional, clinical, and demographic characteristics.
Matching Methodology
We undertook a 1:1:1:1 matching methodology to balance the distribution of
variables associated with risk of need for long-term care in order to reduce bias in the
estimation of need for long-term care. Although propensity score matching is the most
common matching method used in observational studies (Pearl, 2010), there is evidence
that the use of propensity scores for matching purposes such as ours can lead to a
degradation of inferences due to model dependence (King & Nielsen, 2016). Therefore,
we enacted an exact matching methodology in lieu of a propensity score matching
methodology. Unfortunately, the Medicare claims data available to us does not include
concrete indications of functional decline or need for assistance with ADLs. Thus, we
chose to rely on clinical indicators of functional decline for which ICD-9 codes exist.
While two independent studies have analyzed the effectiveness of using ICD-9 codes to
predict “dependency in activities of daily living” (Faurot, et al., 2015) and “functional
decline” (Rosen, et al., 2000), respectively, there is very little overlap between the
conditions identified in the two studies: Faurot and colleagues have identified nine
commonly-coded conditions that can serve as proxies for functional decline, as have
Rosen, however, the only two conditions that are associated with functional decline in
both studies are decubitus ulcers and forms of paralysis (Table 3.1).
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As we did not have a good proxy variable available to indicate functional decline,
we matched individuals based on presence of primary, secondary, and tertiary diagnoses
of identical combinations of the conditions identified by Faurot, et al., and Rosen, et al.,
respectively. This method allowed matches to occur based on clinical conditions that do
have the potential to indicate functional decline, but also based on clinical conditions
such that individuals in our three non-Medicaid formal residential long-term care cohorts
will have identical acuity levels to the base cohort. While not ideal, we believed that
using the Medicaid formal residential long-term care cohort as a baseline for matching
the other three cohorts was the best option available given the limitations in our data set.
Variables on which matches were made included: clinical diagnoses (primary,
secondary, and tertiary, if available) as assessed by a physician during the study year,
number of chronic conditions, Alzheimer’s/senility status, age, sex, and race. These
variables were chosen based on a review of the literature which found these person-level
characteristics most often associated with need for formal long-term care due to the
interplay between age, clinical conditions that affect functional status, chronic condition
worsening, the effects of chronic condition worsening on functional status, the effect of
senility on functional status, and the effect of sex on frailty, independent of issues of
longevity or spousal caregiver availability (Branch & Jette, 1982; Boult, et al., 1994;
Millan-Calenti, et al., 2010; Tas, et al., 2007; Marengoni, et al., 2009).
Race and ethnicity have consistently been demonstrated to be associated with type
of long-term care utilization (whites have been shown to be significantly more likely to
utilize formal long-term care services as compared to African Americans and Hispanics,
who tend to rely more heavily on informal avenues of care) (Wallace, et al., 1998).
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Researchers have postulated that these differences in utilization of formal long-term care
services likely stem in part from cultural differences regarding familial caregiving norms
(Mui & Burnette, 1994; Wallace, et al., 1998; Bradley, et al., 2002), although concerns
about the existence of systemic barriers to access among non-whites could also partially
explain these differences in utilization (Falcone & Broyles, 1994; Cagney & Agree, 1999;
Akamigbo & Wolinsky, 2007). We do know, however, that racial and ethnic differences
in type of long-term care utilization do not belie lower levels of long-term care need in
these populations, as non-whites have also consistently been shown to have poorer health
status than whites, both generally and specifically in areas that demonstrate need for
long-term care (Fried, et al., 2001; Lapane & Davis, 2004).
Our matching algorithm implemented a greedy/nearest neighbor matching
method, without replacement (Austin, 2014). As research has shown that there is little
difference between greedy and optimal methods of matching in terms of selection of sets
of controls for overall matched pooled samples, the main concern in using greedy versus
optimal matching algorithms lies in the ability of optimal matching to reduce distance
within each pair (Gu & Rosenbaum, 1993). As our goal was to create matched cohorts to
be used for logistic regression analysis, distance between individual matched pairs is not
a concern. Furthermore, as our matching algorithm required exact matches as to up to
three clinical diagnoses, as well as number of chronic conditions (0, 1-2, or 3+), sex, age
group, and race, the potential for significant distance between four-way matched cohorts
was low.
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Study Variables
Independent Variable
The independent variable of interest for both Aim 1 and Aim 2 was membership
in one of four long-term care cohorts (Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the
community; Medicare-only beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a residential care
facility; Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who are long-stay residents of a
residential care facility; and Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries, residing in
the community).
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for Aim 1 was risk of PPH. The dependent variables for
Aim 2 were (1) median total annual Medicare charges per beneficiary and (2) risk of
being in the 90th percentile of Medicare expenditures. Twelve Prevention Quality
Indicators (PQI) designated by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality as
“ambulatory care sensitive conditions” were used as the basis for identification of PPH,
with “low birth weight” and “asthma in younger adults” excluded from the list as
inappropriate for the study population. In addition, as PPH among older individuals who
require long-term care can encompass conditions that would not be considered PPH in
healthier populations, we also included conditions identified by a technical expert panel
on potentially preventable hospitalizations among dual-eligible beneficiaries who require
long-term care as either preventable or manageable among all such beneficiaries or only
likely to be preventable or manageable among those beneficiaries who reside in a nursing
facility setting (Walsh, et al., 2012). The clinical indicators of PPH used for this study are
displayed in Table 3.2.
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Control Variables
As our matching algorithm was used to create four distinct cohorts, we needed
only to control for the characteristics on which the cohorts were not matched as they
pertain to potential to affect risk of PPH, as well as costs of PPH and total Medicare
costs, respectively. Thus, beneficiary-level control variables included state Medicaid bedhold policy (yes/no), rurality of residence (rural versus urban), and, within the two
cohorts representing residents of long-term care facilities, facility type (assisted living
facility; custodial care facility; skilled nursing facility; or nursing facility), at the
beneficiary level.
Analytic Approach
Aim 1
Wald chi-square tests (α = 0.05) assessed differences in PPH by cohort status and
covariate. Modified Poisson regression models estimated the relative risk of PPH among
our four matched cohorts, as well as between the two cohorts representing residents of
long-term care facilities, respectively, with dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in longterm care facilities as our referent.
Aim 2
Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA on ranks tests (α = 0.05) assessed differences in
median per capita Medicare expenditures by cohort status, as well as by level of covariate
within each cohort. Modified Poisson regression models estimated the relative risk of
membership in the top 90th percentile or “high cost” group of Medicare beneficiaries,
among our four matched cohorts, as well as between the two cohorts representing
residents of long-term care facilities, respectively, with dual-eligible beneficiaries
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residing in long-term care facilities as our referent. Finally, generalized linear models
estimated the associations between cohort status and estimated log-transformed total
Medicare expenditures per beneficiary.
The statistical analyses were conducted using SAS statistical software, version 9.3
(SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC). Approval from the University of South Carolina
Institutional Review Board was granted on March 24, 2016. The study was categorized as
“exemption status,” as de-identified secondary data was utilized for this study.
Table 3.1. Clinical Conditions Associated with Functional Decline in the Literature
Condition
DM Complications
Podiatric Care
Heart Failure
Sepsis

Difficult Walking
Stroke/Brain Injury

Weakness
Decubitus Ulcer/Pressure Ulcer

ICD-9 Code(s)
250.4, 250.6, 250.7,
250.9
700., 703., 681.1
428., 425., 429.0,
429.1, 429.3, 429.4
01., 036. 038., 040.0,
041., 032.0, 032.1,
681.,682., 730., 031.0,
031.2, 790.7, 032.82,
032.83, 053.0, 053.13,
054.5, 136.3, 320.0,
785.4, 112.83, 112.81,
112.5

Source
Faurot, et al.

719.7, 781.2, 781.3,
438.85, v46.3
348., 430., 431., 432.,
852., 853., 854.,
349.82, 433.01, 433.11,
433.21, 433.31, 433.91,
434.01, 434.11, 434.91
728.2, 728.87, 799.3,
728.2, 728.3, v49.84
707.0, 707.2, 707.

Faurot, et al.

Paralysis/Hemiplegia/Quadriplegia 342., 438.2, 438.3,
438.4, 438.5, 344.,
781.4
Multiple Sclerosis
340, 341.0
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Faurot, et al.
Faurot, et al.
Faurot, et al.

Faurot, et al.

Faurot, et al.
Faurot, et al.; Rosen, et
al.
Faurot, et al.; Rosen, et
al.
Rosen, et al.

Cancer
Alzheimer’s Disease
Dementia other than Alzheimer’s

Parkinson’s Disease
Seizure Disorder

140-165.9, 170-176.9,
179-208.9
290, 290.0, 290.1,
290.2, 290.3, 331.0
290.4-290.43, 290.8,
290.9, 291.1, 291.2,
294, 294.1, 294.8
332-332.1
345-345.5, 345.7345.9, 780.3

Rosen, et al.
Rosen, et al.
Rosen, et al.

Rosen, et al.
Rosen, et al.

Table 3.2. Clinical Indicators of Potentially Preventable
Hospitalization
Condition
Diabetes Short-Term
Complications
Perforated Appendix
Diabetes Long-Term
Complications
COPD or Asthma
Hypertension
Heart Failure
Dehydration
Bacterial Pneumonia
Urinary Tract Infection
Angina Without Procedure
Uncontrolled Diabetes
Lower-Extremity Amputation
among Patients with Diabetes
Anemia
Hypotension
Constipation/Fecal
Impaction/Obstipation
Diarrhea
C. Difficile
Gastroenteritis with nausea or
vomiting
Cellulitis
Skin Ulcers Including Pressure
Ulcers
Lower Respiratory:
Pneumonia/Bronchitis
Falls and Trauma
Altered Mental Status/Acute
Confusion/Delirium
Psychosis, Severe Agitation,
Organic Brain Syndrome
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Source
AHRQ; Walsh, et al.
AHRQ
AHRQ; Walsh, et al.
AHRQ; Walsh, et al.
AHRQ
AHRQ; Walsh, et al.
AHRQ; Walsh, et al.
AHRQ
AHRQ
AHRQ
AHRQ
AHRQ
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.

Weight Loss, Nutritional
Deficiencies, Adult Failure to
Thrive
Seizures

Walsh, et al.

Walsh, et al.
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CHAPTER 4
MANUSCRIPT ONE

EFFECTS OF LONG TERM CARE FACILITY RESIDENCY AND PAYER ON RISK
OF POTENTIALLY PREVENTABLE HOSPITALIZATION AMONG FRAIL
ELDERLY MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 1

1

Robertson, A.S., Probst, J.C., Bennett, K.J., Crouch, E., & Hardin, J.W. To be submitted to Journal of
Aging and Health.
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ABSTRACT
Purpose. We sought to determine whether and to what extent provision of formal,
residential long-term care and payor status were associated with potentially preventable
hospitalizations (PPH) among frail Medicare beneficiaries over age 65.
Methods. We conducted a retrospective cohort analysis that matched Medicare
beneficiaries based on: (1) clinical indicators of functional decline; (2) number of chronic
conditions; (3) diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or senility; (4) age group; (5) sex; and (6) race.
The final cohorts (Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities; Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible
beneficiaries residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities) included 1,096 beneficiaries each, for a
total study sample of 4,384 individuals. Cohort status served as the independent variable.
Our first analysis examined rates of PPH between the four cohorts, while our second
analysis examined the relative risk of PPH between the four cohorts. We controlled
additionally for state Medicaid bed hold policies, rurality of residence, and, among those
residing in long-term care facilities, facility type.
Results. Dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had the lowest
rates of PPH, while Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had
the highest rates of PPH. Dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities
had a significantly lower risk of PPH than either Medicare-only residents of long-term

41

care facilities or dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community. State Medicaid
bed hold policies were not associated with rates or risk of PPH.
Conclusion. While this study did not succeed in elucidating an association between
residential long-term care and PPH, it did identify patterns of PPH between frail elderly
residents of long-term care facilities by payor status: specifically, Medicare-only
residents of long-term care facilities are at significantly higher risk of PPH than their dual
eligible counterparts, which could indicate differential responses to similar clinical
conditions that could stem from payment policies.
Background
As the aged population in this country grows, the number of individuals in need
of long term care services and supports (LTCSS) will also continue to grow—and is
expected to reach 9.6 million Americans aged 65 or older by 2030 (Lakdawalla &
Phillipson, 2002; CBO, 2013). While need for LTCSS is not an inevitable result of aging,
physical health does decline with age. Twenty percent of individuals aged seventy or
older have some form of disability that impacts their ability to care for themselves. Up to
fifty percent of individuals aged eighty-five and older having at least one such disability,
which may require the use of LTCSS (Chappell & Cooke, 2016; WHO, 2006).
Access to formal long-term care can be prohibitively expensive for many
Americans. The average cost of a one-month stay in an assisted living facility is $3,293,
and the average cost of a month of nursing home care is $6,235 (USDHHS, 2016). As
Medicare does not provide reimbursement for LTCSS outside of the post-acute setting
(USDHHS, 2014; CMS, 2015), individuals in need of LTCSS must either pay for these
services out of pocket (either directly or through the purchase of long-term care
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insurance) or qualify for Medicaid-funded long-term care provision based on income and
assets (Social Security Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, 2012; Brown &
Finkelstein, 2006). Due in large part to the difficulties associated with paying out of
pocket or gaining Medicaid eligibility, two-thirds of Americans in need of long-term care
receive this care through exclusively informal means (such as utilizing unpaid care
provided by family and friends). An additional twenty-five percent receive care through
a combination of informal, unpaid care and formal care—usually in the form of home and
community-based services (HCBS) (Doty, 2010).
While informal caregiving—alone or combined with formal HCBS—is often
regarded as an economical alternative to more formal, intensive LTCSS such as
residential long-term care, it too comes with steep costs not only to recipients of care, but
potentially to the health care system as a whole. Specifically, research has shown that
recipients of informal LTCSS and HCBS—both of which can be understood as being less
“comprehensive” than formal, residential long-term care—tend to have more unmet longterm care needs than their peers who receive LTCSS in a comprehensive residential
setting (Komisar, Feder, & Kasper, 2005). These unmet long-term care needs, in turn,
have been consistently demonstrated to lead to poor health outcomes, particularly with
regard to potentially preventable hospitalizations (PPH) (Walsh, et al., 2010; Wysocki, et
al., 2014). Potential explanations for these outcomes includes a lack of assistance with
managing chronic medical conditions (Allen & Mor, 1997), a lack of assistance with
medication management (Kuzuya, 2008), and an increased likelihood of injury due to
lack of mobility assistance and supervision (LaPlante, et al., 2004; Komisar, Feder, &
Kasper, 2005). There is also evidence of increased rates of depression in the population
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of frail elderly who have unmet long-term care needs (Allen & Mor, 1997), which has
been shown to place older adults at increased risk of subsequent physical decline (Pennix,
et al., 1998).
Recent evidence has caused some to question whether the current policy shift
towards providing long-term care services through HCBS rather than residential settings
is entirely prudent given the seeming shortfalls of HCBS and informal care in preventing
unnecessary health decline and higher rates of PPH (Wysocki, et al., 2014; Konetzka,
2014). If it is true that individuals in need of long-term care fare better under the more
comprehensive care received in a residential care setting than they do under the
fragmented care characterized by many HCBS and informal care settings (Miller, Allen,
& Mor, 2008; Freedman & Spillman, 2014), then a renewed focus on increasing access to
comprehensive long-term care is in order.
Alongside studies demonstrating the likely role of comprehensive long-term care
in reducing instances of PPH, however, are studies that indicate that two powerful market
forces also affect PPH among long-term care recipients, based on payer status. First,
many states have enacted bed-hold policies with the intent of protecting Medicaid
beneficiaries by preventing the loss of their residential long-term care beds to more
lucrative Medicare and private-pay patients. Intrator, et al. assert that these policies have
created a powerful perverse incentive: if the marginal profit of holding a bed under
Medicaid-reimbursed bed-hold policy is greater than the marginal profit of keeping the
Medicaid patient in the facility, the facility has every incentive to hospitalize the
Medicaid beneficiary, even if unnecessarily (Intrator, et al., 2007). Indeed, states with
bed-hold policies of at least moderate generosity have been shown to have significantly
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higher rates of transfer from nursing homes to hospitals than states without such policies
(Intrator, et al., 2009). Bed-hold policies only affect twenty-seven states. Further,
Medicaid long-term care beneficiaries who are also eligible for Medicare are typically
eligible for more lucrative Medicare-funded post-acute care once they return to their
original long-term care facility following a hospital stay of at least three days—a fact
which some have suggested could encourage long-term care facilities to transfer
Medicaid-funded residents to hospitals at higher rates than other residents (Grabowski,
2007; Ouslander & Berenson, 2011).
Thus, while research has indicated that comprehensive care—as provided in
residential long-term care facilities—is associated with lower rates of PPH, it has also
shown that if that care is reimbursed by Medicaid, as opposed to privately funded,
hospitalization rates will be higher. What we do not know—and what we seek to better
understand through this research—is whether the protective effects of comprehensive,
residential long-term care outweigh the disadvantages associated with Medicaid coverage
of these services when it comes to PPH.
Methods
Data Sources
This study utilized data from the 5% sample of 2013 Medicare claims and
enrollment data, provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
through the Research Data Assistance Center (ResDAC). A total of five 2013 Medicare
claims and enrollment data files were used: the Base A/B/C/D segment of the Master
Beneficiary Summary File; the Chronic Conditions segment of the Master Beneficiary
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Summary File; the Part D segment of the Master Beneficiary Summary File; the
MedPAR All file; and the Medicare Carrier Claims file.
In addition to these Medicare claims files, we used the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA) Area Health Resource File (AHRF) to determine the
rurality of Medicare beneficiaries based on the Urban Influence Code tied to the
individual beneficiary’s county of residence. A compilation of Medicaid bed-hold
policies by state, authored by The National Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource
Center, was used to create a dichotomous variable for presence or absence of state bedhold policies (NLTCORC, 2012).
Study Sample
This study was limited to fee for service Medicare beneficiaries over the age of
65. To ensure a full year of Medicare utilization, beneficiaries who were not aged 65 at
the beginning of the study year were excluded, as were beneficiaries who died during the
study year. In defining dual eligibility, only those beneficiaries who were dually eligible
for both Medicare and Medicaid for the entire study year were counted. Further, only
those full-year dual eligible beneficiaries who received full Medicaid benefits were
counted as dual-eligible. Similarly, in defining Medicare-only beneficiaries, only those
beneficiaries who were never eligible for either full or partial Medicaid benefits were
counted. Beneficiaries for whom data as to Zip Code of residence, race, or sex were
excluded. These exclusions resulted in an initial sample of 1,305,239 Medicare
beneficiaries (1,160,930 Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; 17,700
Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in residential long-term care facilities; 98,916
Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and 27,693
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Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in residential long-term care
facilities) to extract the matched cohorts. Individuals were considered to be “residents” of
residential long-term care facilities if they had physician claims with a place of service in
a long-term care facility for at least three consecutive quarters during the study year.
Study Design
Using a retrospective cohort analysis, we examined the risk of PPH between four
matched cohorts: Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only
beneficiaries who were long-stay residents of a residential long-term care facility;
Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and
Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who were long-stay residents of a
residential long-term care facility.
Due to the potential for inherent selection biases in the data, it was necessary to
reduce imbalance in the distribution of confounders between the base cohort group
(Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries) and the other three cohorts (Stuart,
2010). As research has indicated that the utilization of propensity scores to perform
cohort matching increases the imbalance of unmeasured confounders (Brooks &
Ohsfeldt, 2013; King & Nielsen, 2016), we chose instead to perform an exact matching
methodology which utilized a fully blocked randomized experimental design (King &
Nielsen, 2016).
The selection of matching variables was based in part on the Gelberg-Andersen
Behavioral Model for Vulnerable Populations (Gelberg, Andersen, & Leake, 2000). This
model asserts that predisposing characteristics (i.e., demographic, social, and cultural
factors) affect an individual’s enabling resources (i.e., financial and organizational
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factors), which in turn affect need for health services (both perceived and evaluated need)
and health outcomes (Babitsch, Gohl, & von Lengerke, 2012). In turn, both perceived and
evaluated need for health services affect health behavior in the form of health practices
and the use of health services, which affects health outcomes (Gelberg, Andersen, &
Leake, 2000).
Age affects method of long-term care provision in that the older a Medicare
beneficiary is, the more likely they are to need formal long-term care, as factors such as
widowhood and the compounding of functional and medical decline increase with age
(Branch & Jette, 1982; Spillman & Lubitz, 2000). Age also affects ability to self-insure,
as long-term care insurance premiums increase significantly with age (AALTCI, 2016).
Sex affects enabling resources as men are more likely to have informal long-term care
provided by wives (Navaie-Waliser, Spriggs, & Feldman, 2002; Lakdawalla & Philipson,
2002). Race and ethnicity affect enabling resources due to differential cultural norms
between whites, African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians as to the burden of providing
comprehensive informal care for an elderly relative, perceptions of duty to do so, as well
as potential effects of discrimination on access to formal long-term care (Wallace, et al.,
1997; Dilworth-Anderson, Williams, & Gibson, 2002; Bradley, et al., 2002).
To accommodate the variables elucidated above, we performed a 1:1:1:1 exact
nearest neighbor match, without replacement (Kawabata, Tran, & Hines, 1999), matching
on the following beneficiary-level characteristics: (1) clinical diagnosis of one, two, or
three clinical indicators of functional decline; (2) number of chronic conditions (zero,
one, or two or more); (3) diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or senility; (4) age (66-70; 71-75; 7680; 81-85; 86-90; 91 or older); (4) sex; and (5) race (white, non-Hispanic; African

48

American, non-Hispanic; Hispanic; Native American/Alaskan Indian; or Other). Clinical
indicators of functional decline were based on a number of ICD-9 codes demonstrated by
Faurot, et al. and Rosen, et al.), respectively, to be valid indicators of functional decline
in elderly adults (Faurot, et al., 2015; Rosen, et al., 2000) (Table 4.1). Individuals were
matched on the other four variables based on a review of the literature that showed these
individual-level characteristics are most often associated with need for formal long-term
care due to the interplay between age, the effects of chronic condition multi-morbidity on
functional status, the effects of senility on functional status, and the effect of sex on
frailty, independent of issues of longevity or spousal caregiver ability (Branch & Jette,
1982; Boult, et al., 1994; Stuck, et al., 1999; Millan-Calenti, et al., 2010; Tas, et al., 2007;
Marengoni, et al., 2009; Cawthon, et al., 2007).
The goal of the matching methodology was to ensure that the four study cohorts
were similar in terms of characteristics that are known to affect need for long-term care.
We used Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care
residential facilities as our base cohort under the theory that individuals in this group
were the most likely to be in need of residential long-term care, as eligibility for
Medicaid coverage of residential long-term care requires considerable documentation
(Grabowski, 2007). The final study sample consisted of four matched study cohorts of
1,096 Medicare beneficiaries each, for a total study sample of 4,384 individuals (Table
4.3). Contrary to Fossett & Burke, we believe than any index of Medicaid generosity in
long-term care must account not only for demand-side aspects of Medicaid long-term
care policy, but also supply-side aspects, including the effects of the market incentives
we have discussed above (Fossett & Burke, 2010).
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Independent Variable: Cohort Status
The independent variable, cohort status, was designed to measure the interaction
between long-term care payer type (private pay versus Medicaid coverage) and place of
residence (community versus residential long-term care setting). Medicare-only
beneficiaries residing in residential long-term care facilities for this amount of time
would be unlikely to have their long-term care services covered by Medicare due to the
time-limited nature of Medicare post-acute payment for long-term care services, and
would thus be paying for these services privately, either directly out of pocket or through
a long-term care insurance benefit.
Dependent Variable: Potentially Preventable Hospitalization
The dependent variable was occurrence of a PPH. In defining a PPH in the elderly
population, we began by including twelve of the fourteen Prevention Quality Indicators
designated by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality as “ambulatory care
sensitive conditions,” excluding “low birth weight’ and “asthma in younger adults.”
(Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2012). In addition, recognizing that PPH
among frail older adults who require long-term care can encompass conditions that would
not be considered PPH in younger, healthier populations, we also included conditions
identified by a technical expert panel on PPH among dual-eligible beneficiaries who
require long-term care. A list of all conditions for which hospitalization was defined as a
PPH, and their accompanying ICD-9 codes, can be found in Table 4.2.
Covariates
For the regression analyses, control variables included state Medicaid bed-hold
policy (yes/no), rurality of residence (rural versus urban), and within the two cohorts
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representing residents of long-term care facilities, facility type (assisted living facility;
custodial care facility; skilled nursing facility; or nursing facility), at the beneficiary
level. While the effects of regional practice patterns and state-level Medicaid policies
beyond bed-hold policy quite likely affect PPH in this population, we lacked the
statistical power to control for either Hospital Referral Region or state. Further, the
complexity of differences in Medicaid policies from state to state preclude an accurate
grouping of states by long-term care Medicaid generosity.
Analytical Approach
Wald chi-square tests (α = 0.05) assessed differences in PPH by cohort status and
covariate. Modified Poisson regression models estimated the relative risk of PPH among
our four matched cohorts, as well as between the two cohorts representing residents of
long-term care facilities, respectively, with dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in longterm care facilities as our referent. As our matching methodology had already controlled
for clinical indicators of frailty, number of chronic conditions, Alzheimer’s/senility
status, age, sex, and race/ethnicity, we did not control for these covariates in the adjusted
model. A separate analysis of these variables using modified Poisson regression modeling
confirmed that the inclusion of these matching variables as control variables had no effect
on other variables in the model. The statistical analyses were conducted using SAS
statistical software, version 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC).
Results
Unadjusted Rates of PPH
Table 4.4 displays the unadjusted rates of PPH, as well as unadjusted odds of
PPH. Dual eligible beneficiaries who resided in a long-term care facility had the lowest
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rates of PPH among the four matched cohorts, while Medicare-only beneficiaries who
resided in long-term care facilities had the highest rates of PPH. Other factors associated
with higher rates of PPH include sex (with females having higher rates of PPH than
males), and rurality (with rural individuals having higher rates of PPH than their urban
counterparts). Individuals with two or more chronic conditions had significantly higher
rates of PPH than individuals with no chronic conditions, and individuals with a
diagnosis or Alzheimer’s or other form of dementia had considerably higher rates of PPH
than did individuals without such a diagnosis. Residents of assisted living facilities and
custodial care facilities were significantly less likely to have a PPH than were residents of
skilled nursing facilities; there was no statistical difference in likelihood of PPH between
residents of skilled nursing facilities and residents of nursing facilities or beneficiaries
residing in the community. Factors that were not associated with PPH in the bivariate
analysis were age and race. Further, the presence of a state Medicaid bed hold policy was
not associated with rate of PPH.
Adjusted Risk of PPH
Multivariate modified Poisson regression modeling estimated the relative risk of
PPH in the study population. To better elucidate the effects of the covariates on risk of
PPH, seven models were performed: three examining the effects of cohort status, state
Medicaid bed-hold policies, and rurality, successively, among all four cohorts, and four
examining the effects of cohort status, state Medicaid bed-hold policies, rurality, and type
of residential facility, successively, among beneficiaries residing in long-term care
facilities (Tables 4.5 and 4.6).
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The first analysis examined the risk of PPH by cohort status alone among all four
cohorts, and reflects the information provided in Table 4.4. In the first model, the cohort
of Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had the highest risk of
PPH (RR 1.31, p=0.0056) when compared to the cohort of dual eligible beneficiaries
residing in long-term care facilities, followed by the cohort of dual eligible beneficiaries
who resided in the community (RR 1.24, p = 0.0301). The second and third models,
which controlled for state bed-hold policies and state bed-hold policies as well as rurality,
respectively, had very little effect on risk of PPH across the four study cohorts, with the
final model demonstrating a 34% higher risk of PPH for Medicare-only LTC facility
residents relative to dual eligible LTC facility residents (p = 0.0030), and a 25% higher
risk of PPH for dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community compared to dual
eligible LTC facility residents (p = 0.0239).
In the next analysis, we restricted our examination to residents of LTC facilities.
Models 4 through 6 present relative risk by cohort, sequentially adding state bed-hold
policies and rurality (Table 4.6). In all models in this analysis, Medicare-only
beneficiaries residing in residential long-term care facilities had a significantly higher
risk of PPH than did Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in residential
long-term care facilities.
The final model, which controlled for the additional variable of type of long-term
care facility, demonstrated a considerably higher relative risk of PPH among Medicareonly LTC facility residents relative to dual eligible LTC facility residents (RR 1.53, p
<.0001). This final model also showed a significantly higher risk of PPH among
residents of nursing home (skilled nursing facilities and nursing facilities), compared to
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residents of assisted living facilities (RR 3.03 for residents of skilled nursing facilities,
and RR 2.61 for residents of nursing facilities).
Discussion
The results of our study suggest that dual eligible beneficiaries residing in longterm care facilities are significantly less likely than both Medicare-only LTC facility
residents and dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community to have a PPH, and,
further, that the risk of PPH among Medicare-only LTC facility residents is 53% higher
than the risk of PPH among dual eligible LTC facility residents after accounting for the
type of long-term care facility in which beneficiaries reside.
Given that most state Medicaid policies are more likely to cover nursing home
care than care in assisted living facilities, yet assisted living facilities are considerably
more affordable—particularly when paying out of pocket—it is not surprising that 82.1%
of dual-eligible long-term care facility residents resided in a nursing facility of some
form, while only 40.4% of Medicare-only long-term care facility residents residing in a
nursing facility, with 59.6% of that population residing in assisted living facilities or
custodial care facilities (See Table 4.3). The finding that residents of skilled nursing
facilities were at a three-fold risk of PPH compared to residents of assisted living
facilities—and that residents of nursing facilities had a PPH risk level of two and a half
times that of assisted living facility residents, however, argues against the hypothesis on
which this research was based. If comprehensiveness of care reduced risk of PPH, we
would expect residents of facilities providing less comprehensive care—i.e., assisted
living and custodial care facilities—to have a higher risk of PPH than residents receiving
comprehensive nursing and medical care alongside personal assistance. As our findings
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demonstrate the opposite, further research will be necessary to better understand the
association between type of long-term care facility and risk of PPH. It is likely that
residents of nursing facilities and skilled nursing facilities are sicker than residents of
assisted living and custodial care facilities in ways for which we were unable to account
in our matching methodology.
Although the results of this research did not succeed in identifying the effects of
place of residence (community versus long-term care facility), our study did elucidate
patterns of PPH between frail elderly residents of long-term care facilities by payer
status. Controlling through either matching methodology or regression analysis for a
number of covariates, we have found that the significantly higher risk of PPH we have
ascertained among Medicare-only LTC facility residents cannot be attributed to frailty
level (as measured by clinical indicators of frailty), race/ethnicity, Alzheimer’s/senility
status, age, sex, rurality of residence, or state Medicaid bed-hold policy.
Although we lacked the statistical power to control for regional practice patterns
or state-level policies beyond presence of a state Medicaid bed-hold policy, the fact that
state bed-hold policies were found to be insignificant in predicting risk of PPH indicates
that suspected perverse incentives towards increased unnecessary hospitalizations among
Medicaid long-term care residents may not be a significant factor in risk of PPH in the
population of frail elderly. These findings contradict those of researchers who have found
positive correlations between hospitalization and state Medicaid bed-hold policies
(Intrator, et al., 2007; Intrator, et al., 2009; Grabowski, et al., 2010; Unruh, 2013). The
most recent previous research of the effects of Medicaid bed-hold policies on
hospitalization used data collected between the years 2000 and 2005, so it is possible that
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facilities have adjusted appropriately to the perverse incentives inherent in bed-hold
policies in the intervening time between 2005 and the year of our study, 2013. It is also
possible that the findings of previous researchers could be attributed to large sample
sizes, as sample sizes for these studies were 22 million person-quarters for Unruh, et al.’s
study, and 3.3 million observations for Grabowski, et al.’s study, respectively. More
research will be necessary to determine whether and to what extent other regional, state,
and national policies may affect risk of PPH in this population, as well as to understand
what other factors could be contributing to the significant differences in risk of PPH,
particularly between the two cohorts representing LTC facility residents.
While a PPH is indicative of a lack of appropriate preventive and ameliorative
care leading up to the preventable hospitalization, and while we feel that the most likely
explanation of our findings hinges on issues of policy, we cannot discount the possibility
that in some cases a PPH may be the preferred outcome, such that a lack of PPH may be
indicative of untreated conditions that would require a PPH admission to properly treat.
Specifically, it is possible that potential differences in treatment of private pay long-term
care residents as compared to residents for whom care is reimbursed by Medicaid, such
as differences in facility quality and availability of patient advocates, could help to
explain the significantly lower risk of PPH among the dual eligible LTC resident
population. Further analysis will be aimed at examining specific types of PPH by payer
status and long-term care facility type.
Limitations
This study was limited by a relatively small sample size, which not only
prevented us from controlling for state of residence—which would have allowed us some
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ability to broadly measure the effects of Medicaid and other long-term care policies
specific to each state—but also prevented us from controlling for regional differences in
practice patterns based on Hospital Referral Regions. Our sample size of 4,384 also did
not provide us with a large enough sample to subset race or ethnicity by more than two
levels.
Our study was also partially limited by our reliance, of necessity, on clinical
indicators of frailty to match members of the other three cohorts to the dual eligible
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities. Information regarding the utilization of
oxygen, hospital beds, and mobility devices was only available for community-dwelling
beneficiaries. Thus, while the cohorts are well matched in terms of frailty and potential
need for long-term care, information as to DME use among all cohort members would
have strengthened our study.
Finally, as our study analyzed only Medicare claims data, we only had
information pertaining to home health services reimbursed by Medicare, and did not have
information as to the home health or other supportive services utilized by either
Medicare-only or dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in the community. This information
would have been a powerful covariate to consider in our successive Poisson regression
modeling.
Conclusion
Our findings suggest that dual eligible residents of LTC facilities are at a
significantly lower risk of PPH than their similarly situated counterparts who are either
Medicare-only residents of LTC facilities or dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the
community. The reasons for the significant differences in risk of PPH—particularly
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between Medicare-only residents of LTC facilities and dual eligible LTC facility
residents—is not readily apparent, and cannot be explained by a number of covariates
associated in the literature with PPH. It seems likely that variables that could not be
controlled for in our model—particularly regional practice patterns and state-level
policies, but also potential differences in quality of care linked to payer status—may help
to explain our findings.
Table 4.1. Clinical Indicators of Functional Decline, with sources
Condition

ICD-9 Code(s)

Source

DM Complications

250.4, 250.6, 250.7, 250.9

Faurot, et al.

Podiatric Care

700., 703., 681.1

Faurot, et al.

Heart Failure

428., 425., 429.0, 429.1, 429.3, 429.4

Faurot, et al.

Sepsis

01., 036. 038., 040.0, 041., 032.0,
032.1, 681.,682., 730., 031.0, 031.2,
790.7, 032.82, 032.83, 053.0, 053.13,
054.5, 136.3, 320.0, 785.4, 112.83,
112.81, 112.5
719.7, 781.2, 781.3, 438.85, v46.3

Faurot, et al.

348., 430., 431., 432., 852., 853., 854.,
349.82, 433.01, 433.11, 433.21, 433.31,
433.91, 434.01, 434.11, 434.91
728.2, 728.87, 799.3, 728.2, 728.3,
v49.84
707.0, 707.2, 707.

Faurot, et al.

Faurot, et al.; Rosen, et al.

Multiple Sclerosis

342., 438.2, 438.3, 438.4, 438.5, 344.,
781.4
340, 341.0

Cancer

140-165.9, 170-176.9, 179-208.9

Rosen, et al.

Alzheimer’s Disease

290, 290.0, 290.1, 290.2, 290.3, 331.0

Rosen, et al.

Dementia other than Alzheimer’s

Rosen, et al.

Parkinson’s Disease

290.4-290.43, 290.8, 290.9, 291.1,
291.2, 294, 294.1, 294.8
332-332.1

Seizure Disorder

345-345.5, 345.7-345.9, 780.3

Rosen, et al.

Difficult Walking
Stroke/Brain Injury

Weakness
Decubitus Ulcer/Pressure Ulcer
Paralysis/Hemiplegia/Quadriplegia

Faurot, et al.

Faurot, et al.
Faurot, et al.; Rosen, et al.

Rosen, et al.

Rosen, et al.

Table 4.2. Indicators of Potentially Preventable
Hospitalizations, with sources
Condition
Diabetes Short-Term Complications
Perforated Appendix
Diabetes Long-Term Complications
COPD or Asthma
Hypertension

Source
AHRQ; Walsh, et al.
AHRQ
AHRQ; Walsh, et al.
AHRQ; Walsh, et al.
AHRQ
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Heart Failure
Dehydration
Bacterial Pneumonia
Urinary Tract Infection
Angina Without Procedure
Uncontrolled Diabetes
Lower-Extremity Amputation among
Patients with Diabetes
Anemia
Hypotension
Constipation/Fecal
Impaction/Obstipation
Diarrhea/Gastroenteritis
C. Difficile
Cellulitis
Skin Ulcers Including Pressure Ulcer
Lower Respiratory:
Pneumonia/Bronchitis
Falls and Trauma
Altered Mental Status/Acute
Confusion/Delirium
Psychosis, Severe Agitation, Organic
Brain Syndrome
Weight Loss, Nutritional Deficiencies,
Adult Failure to Thrive
Seizures

AHRQ; Walsh, et al.
AHRQ; Walsh, et al.
AHRQ
AHRQ
AHRQ
AHRQ
AHRQ
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.
Walsh, et al.

Table 4.3. Characteristics of Study Cohorts, 2013 Medicare Claims Files, CMS
Medicare Only,
CommunityDwelling
1096

Medicare Only,
LTC Resident

Dual Eligible, LTC
Resident

Percentage

1096

Dual Eligible,
Community
Dwelling
1096

1096

100%

Male

346

346

346

346

31.6%

Female

750

750

750

750

68.4%

66-70

109

109

109

109

9.9%

71-75

119

119

119

119

10.9%

76-80

171

171

171

171

15.6%

81-85

244

244

244

244

22.3%

86-90

232

232

232

232

21.2%

91+

221

221

221

221

20.2%

White, Non-Hispanic

943

943

943

943

86.0%

Non-White, or White,
Hispanic
Rurality*

153

153

153

153

14.0%

Urban

916

916

916

916

83.6%

Rural

180

180

180

180

16.4%

362

362

362

362

33.0%

Total
Sex*

Age Group*

Race*

Alzheimer’s/Senility*
No

59

Yes

734

734

734

734

67.0%

0

20

20

20

20

1.8%

1

126

126

126

126

11.5%

2+

950

950

950

950

86.7%

No

409 (37.3%)

452 (41.2%)

323 (29.5%)

358 (32.7%)

Yes

687 (62.7%)

644 (58.8%)

773 (70.5%)

738 (67.3%)

Type of Long-Term Care
Facility**
None/Community
Resident
Assisted Living

1096 (100%)

0

1096 (100%)

0

0

515 (47.0%)

0

132 (12.0%)

Custodial Care

0

138 (12.6%)

0

64 (5.8%)

Nursing Facility

0

405 (37.0%)

0

864 (78.8%)

Skilled Nursing Facility

0

38 (3.5%)

0

36 (3.3%)

Chronic Condition
Number*

Bed Hold Policy**

*Indicates matching variable; **Indicates control variable

Table 4.4. Unadjusted Rate of Potentially Preventable Hospitalization, 2013, Medicare
Claims Data, CMS
% PPH

p-value

Unadjusted Odds Ratio

Medicare Only, Community-Dwelling

16.70

0.0392

1.235 (0.978-1.560)

Medicare Only, LTC Resident

18.34

1.384 (1.100-1.741)

Dual Eligible, Community-Dwelling

17.34

1.292 (1.025-1.629)

Dual Eligible, LTC Resident

13.96

Reference

Male

14.88

Female

17.37

66-70

15.14

71-75

15.76

1.049 (0.732-1.502)

76-80

17.84

1.217 (0.878-1.688)

81-85

16.39

1.099 (0.805-1.502)

86-90

17.35

1.177 (0.861-1.608)

91+

16.18

1.082 (0.788-1.486)

White, Non-Hispanic

16.83

Cohort

Sex
0.0400

Reference
1.202 (1.008-1.432)

Age Group
0.8216

Reference

Race
0.2663
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Reference

Non-White, or White, Hispanic

15.03

Urban

15.91

Rural

19.49

No

11.40

Yes

19.14

0.874 (0.689-1.108)

Rurality
0.0126

Reference
1.841 (1.528-2.218)

Alzheimer’s/Senility
<.0001

Reference
1.280 (1.054-1.554)

Chronic Condition Number
0

1.25

<.0001

Reference

1

2.78

2.256 (0.293-17.395)

2+

18.74

18.209 (2.530-131.057)

No

16.6

Yes

16.57

Bed Hold Policy
0.9803

Reference
0.998 (0.845-1.179)

Type of Long-Term Care Facility

<.0001

Skilled Nursing Facility

Reference

None (Community)

7.47

0.706 (0.474-1.050)

Assisted Living Facility

9.85

0.278 (0.141-0.550)

Custodial Care Facility

22.52

0.376 (0.207-0.685)

Nursing Facility

17.25

0.717 (0.480-1.073)

Table 4.5. Adjusted Relative Risk of Potentially Preventable
Hospitalization, by Cohort Status, All Cohorts, 2013, Medicare
Claims Data, CMS
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

1.20

1.20

1.22

1.31*

1.31*

1.34*

1.24*

1.24*

1.25*

Ref

Ref

Ref

Cohort
Medicare Only,
CommunityDwelling
Medicare Only,
LTC Resident
Dual Eligible,
CommunityDwelling
Dual Eligible,
LTC Resident
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Bed Hold Policy
No

Ref

Ref

Yes

1.01

1.02

Rurality
Urban

Ref

Rural

1.25*

*= p <.05; ** = p <.0001

Table 4.6. Adjusted Relative Risk of Potentially Preventable
Hospitalization, by Cohort Status, 2013, Medicare Claims Data, CMS
Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

1.32*

1.35*

1.53**

Ref

Ref

Ref

No

Ref

Ref

Ref

Yes

1.06

1.07

1.10

Urban

Ref

Ref

Rural

1.29*

1.24

Cohort
Medicare 1.31*
Only, LTC
Resident
Dual Eligible, Ref
LTC Resident
Bed Hold
Policy

Rurality

Facility Type
Assisted

Ref

Living
Custodial Care

1.26

62

Skilled
Nursing
Facility
Nursing

3.03*

2.61*

Facility
*= p <.05; ** = p <.0001
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CHAPTER 5
MANUSCRIPT TWO
EFFECTS OF LONG TERM CARE FACILITY RESIDENCY AND PAYER ON
TOTAL MEDICARE EXPENDITURES AMONG FRAIL ELDERLY MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES 1

1

Robertson, A.S., Bennett, K.J., Probst, J.C., Crouch, E., & Hardin, J.W. To be submitted to Journal of
Health Politics, Policy, and Law.
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ABSTRACT
Purpose. We sought to determine whether and to what extent provision of formal,
residential long-term care and payor status were associated with Medicare expenditure
patterns among frail Medicare beneficiaries over age 65.
Methods. We conducted a retrospective cohort analysis that matched Medicare
beneficiaries based on: (1) clinical indicators of functional decline; (2) number of chronic
conditions; (3) diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or senility; (4) age group; (5) sex; and (6) race.
The final cohorts (Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities; Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible
beneficiaries residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities) included 1,096 beneficiaries each, for a
total study sample of 4,384 individuals. Cohort status served as the independent variable.
Our first analysis examined median per capita Medicare beneficiaries by cohort status,
while our second analysis examined risk of being “high cost” Medicare beneficiaries (i.e.,
having expenditures in the 90th percentile of Medicare expenditures). We controlled
additionally for state Medicaid bed hold policies, rurality of residence, and, among those
residing in long-term care facilities, facility type.
Results. Dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had a significantly
lower risk of being “high cost” than did Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in longterm care facilities or dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community. However,
dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had significantly higher per
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capita expenditures than Medicare-only long-term care facility residents. State Medicaid
bed hold policies were not associated with Medicare expenditures.
Conclusion. While this study did not succeed in elucidating an association between
residential long-term care and Medicare expenditures in general, they do suggest that
dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities are less costly to the
Medicare system than dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community. The finding
that Medicare-only long term care facility residents have lower per capita Medicare
expenditures than their dual eligible counterparts, yet are at greater risk of being “high
cost” beneficiaries may suggest patterns of higher-intensity medical care for Medicareonly residents of long-term care facilities compared to their dual eligible peers.
Background
In recent years, the focus of American long-term care policy—particularly
Medicaid long-term care policy—has shifted away from residential care and towards the
provision of long-term care services and supports (LTCSS) through home and
community based services (HCBS) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012). Similarly, as
Medicare does not provide reimbursement for long-term care outside of the post-acute
setting, individuals who are not eligible for Medicaid long-term care coverage are relying
more and more on informal home and community-based care, including care provided
without direct costs most often by family members. While this “rebalancing” of longterm care towards informal and community-based services is often viewed as an
economically efficient, it is possible that a focus away from comprehensive long-term
care merely shifts costs to the Medicare system, as unmet long-term care needs have the
potential to increase healthcare utilization, and thus expenditures.
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Research suggests that recipients of informal or formal community-based longterm care are more likely to have unmet long-term care needs than their counterparts
receiving LTCSS in residential facilities (Freedman & Spillman, 2014). Further, these
unmet long-term care needs have been associated with increased incidence of all-cause
hospitalizations, ED visits, and physician visits (Walsh, et al., 2010; Sands, et al., 2006;
Huiping, et al., 2012; Kuzuya et al., 2008; Quail, Wolfson, & Lippman, 2011; Hass, et
al., 2015; Kuzuya, 2006). Reasons for these negative outcomes include a lack of
assistance with managing chronic medical conditions (Allen & Mor, 1997), a lack of
assistance with medication management (Kuzuya, 2008) increased likelihood of
accidental injury (LaPlante, et al., 2004; Komisar, Feder, & Kasper, 2005), and increased
rates of depression in the population of frail elderly who have unmet long-term care
needs (Allen & Mor, 1997), which has been shown to put older adults at increased risk of
subsequent physical decline (Pennix, et al., 1998). Thus, we might assume that Medicare
beneficiaries in need of long-term care who reside in the community will have higher
total Medicare costs than Medicare beneficiaries in need of long term care who reside in
residential long-term care facilities. Unfortunately, however, the long-term care policy
landscape is more complicated than this.
Specifically, in attempting to understand health care costs among elderly
individuals in need of long-term care, we must consider not only type of care in terms of
residential setting, but also type of care in terms of payer context. There is a growing
body of literature that asserts an association between payer type and health outcomes and
utilization—an association that is influenced by policies at the local, state, and national
level. Researchers have identified two market forces that incentivize the utilization of
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Medicare-funded acute care services by dual eligible beneficiaries receiving Medicaidfunded long-term care in residential facilities. First, the existence of state Medicaid bedhold policies has been demonstrated to increase hospitalization rates among not only
Medicaid beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities, but also to a smaller extent
among Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in such care facilities (Intrator, 2007;
Grabowski, 2010). In addition, Medicaid long-term care beneficiaries who are also
eligible for Medicare are typically eligible for more lucrative Medicare-funded post-acute
care once they return to their original long-term care facility following a hospital stay of
at least three days. This policy creates a clear incentive to hospitalize Medicaid
beneficiaries unnecessarily, and at potentially considerable costs to the Medicare system,
in order not only to avoid utilizing nursing home resources to care for a sick patient, but
also to ensure considerably higher reimbursement rates for care provided as the patient
recovers from his or her illness (Grabowski, 2007; Ouslander & Berenson, 2011).
Wysocki, et al.’s finding that elderly users of formal home and community based
long-term care services were at increased risk of both potentially preventable
hospitalizations and non-potentially preventable hospitalizations compared to elderly
nursing home residents with similar levels of physical and medical decline provides
insight into differences in avoidable hospitalizations between dual eligible beneficiaries
by type of long-term care (Wysocki, 2014). However, a thorough understanding of
elderly long-term care policy requires an examination not only of those Medicare
beneficiaries whose LTCSS are covered by Medicaid, but also those beneficiaries who
either pay for LTCSS out of pocket or who rely solely on informal care. Our research
seeks to shed light on the interplay between the seeming protective effects of
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comprehensive, residential care on one hand and, on the other, the effects of perverse
incentives towards unnecessary health care utilization by residents of long-term care
facilities for whom care is reimbursed by Medicaid on the other. We address these
questions by examining expenditures across four cohorts of Medicare beneficiaries,
characterized by residence and payor status, matched based on likely health care need.
Methods
Data Sources
We obtained a 5% sample of 2013 Medicare claims and enrollment data from the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). This study utilized five 2013
Medicare claims and enrollment data files: the Base A/B/C/D segment of the Master
Beneficiary Summary File; the Chronic Conditions segment of the Master Beneficiary
Summary File; the Part D segment of the Master Beneficiary Summary File; the
MedPAR All file; and the Medicare Carrier Claims file. We linked the Medicare claims
data to the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) Area Health Resource
File (AHRF) to determine the rurality of Medicare beneficiaries based on the Urban
Influence Codes. We created a dichotomous variable for presence of a state Medicaid
bed-hold policy (yes/no) using a compilation of Medicaid bed-hold policies by state
published by The National Long-Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center (NLTCORC,
2012).
Study Sample
We limited our study population to fee for service Medicare beneficiaries over the
age of 65. To ensure each beneficiary studied had a full year of Medicare utilization
available for analysis, beneficiaries who were not aged 65 at the beginning of the study

69

year were excluded, as were beneficiaries who died during the year. In defining dual
eligibility, only those beneficiaries who were dually eligible for both Medicare and
Medicaid for the entire study year were counted. Further, only those full-year dual
eligible beneficiaries who received full Medicaid benefits were counted as dual-eligible.
In defining Medicare-only beneficiaries, only those beneficiaries who were never eligible
for either full or partial Medicaid benefits were counted. Beneficiaries for whom data as
to Zip Code of residence, race, or sex were excluded. Individuals were classified as
“residents” of long-term care facilities if they had physician claims (drawn from the
Carrier Claims file) with a place of service in a long-term care facility for at least three
consecutive quarters during the study year.
Our final study population of four matched cohorts of 1,096 Medicare
beneficiaries each (or 4,384 total Medicare beneficiaries) was drawn from a final study
sample of 1.3 million Medicare beneficiaries (1,160,930 Medicare-only beneficiaries
residing in the community; 17,700 Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in residential
long-term care facilities; 98,916 Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in
the community; and 27,693 Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in
residential long-term care facilities).
Study Design
Using a retrospective cohort analysis, we examined median Medicare
expenditures and estimated log-transformed total Medicare costs, as well as risk of
having Medicare expenditures in the top 90th percentile of all Medicare beneficiaries with
expenditures (i.e., of being “high cost” Medicare beneficiaries). Beneficiaries were sorted
into four matched cohorts: Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community;
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Medicare-only beneficiaries who were long-stay residents of a residential long-term care
facility; Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in the community; and
Medicare/Medicaid dual-eligible beneficiaries who were long-stay residents of a
residential long-term care facility. Characteristics of these cohorts are displayed in Table
5.1.
Due to the potential for selection bias, we sought to reduce the imbalance in the
distribution of confounders between our base cohort group (Medicare/Medicaid dual
eligible beneficiaries) and our three cohorts (Stuart, 2010). As research indicates that
propensity score matching can increase the imbalance of unmeasured confounders
(Brooks & Ohsfeldt, 2013; King & Nielson, 2016), our study employed an exact
matching methodology, utilizing a fully blocked randomized experimental design (King
& Nielson, 2016).
We based our selection of variables on which to perform this matching in part on
the Gelberg-Andersen Behavioral Model for Vulnerable Populations (Gelberg, Andersen,
& Leake, 2000). The Gelberg-Andersen Model asserts that predisposing characteristics
(i.e., demographic, social, and cultural factors) affect an individual’s enabling resources
(i.e., financial and organizational factors), which affect need for health services (both
perceived and evaluated need) and health outcomes (Babitsch, Gohl, & von Lengerke,
2012). In turn, both perceived and evaluated need for health services affect health
behavior in the form of health practices and the use of health services, which affects
health outcomes (Gelberg, Andersen, & Leake, 2000).
We performed a 1:1:1:1 exact nearest neighbor match, without replacement
(Kawabata, Tran, & Hines, 1999), matching on the following beneficiary-level
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characteristics: (1) clinical diagnosis of one, two, or three clinical indicators of functional
decline; (2) number of chronic conditions (zero, one, or two or more); (3) diagnosis of
Alzheimer’s or senility; (4) age (66-70; 71-75; 76-80; 81-85; 86-90; 91 or older); (4) sex;
and (5) race (white, non-Hispanic; African American, non-Hispanic; Hispanic; Native
American/Alaskan Indian; or Other). Clinical indicators of functional decline were based
on a number of ICD-9 codes demonstrated by Faurot, et al., and Rosen, et al.,
respectively, to be valid indicators of functional decline in elderly adults (Faurot, et al.,
2015; Rosen, et al., 2000) (Table 4.1). Individuals were matched on the other four
variables based on a review of the literature that showed these individual-level
characteristics are most often associated with need for formal long-term care due to the
interplay between age, the effects of chronic condition multi-morbidity on functional
status, the effects of senility on functional status, and the effect of sex on frailty,
independent of issues of longevity or spousal caregiver ability (Branch & Jette, 1982;
Boult, et al., 1994; Stuck, et al., 1999; Millan-Calenti, et al., 2010; Tas, et al., 2007;
Marengoni, et al., 2009; Cawthon, et al., 2007).
Independent Variable: Cohort Status
Our independent variable, cohort status, was designed to measure the interaction
between long-term care payer type (private pay versus Medicaid coverage) and place of
residence (community versus residential long-term care setting). In order to be classified
as a long-term resident of a long-term care facility, beneficiaries must have had physician
claims with a place of service code in a long-term care facility (defined as an assisted
living facility, custodial care facility, nursing facility, or skilled nursing facility) for three
consecutive quarters during the study year.
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Dependent Variables
The dependent variable in the bivariate analysis was median per capita Medicare
expenditures. The dependent variable in the Poisson regression analysis was membership
in the 90th percentile of Medicare expenditures. The dependent variable in the generalized
linear model analyses was the log-transformed total Medicare expenditures per
beneficiary. We analyzed the log transformed total expenditures due to skewness in the
data (Skewness Statistic 2.806). The dependent variable in the Poisson regression
analyses was a beneficiary’s status as having Medicare expenditures in the top 90th
percentile of all Medicare beneficiaries with expenditures during the study year. We
analyzed the entire 5% sample of Medicare beneficiaries’ claims data to determine that
the 90th percentile of expenditures for Medicare beneficiaries with at least $1 in Medicare
expenditures was $22,081 per capita. Thus, individuals in our study population whose
annual Medicare expenditures were greater than this amount were considered “high cost”
Medicare beneficiaries
Covariates
For the regression analyses, we controlled for state Medicaid bed-hold policy
(yes/no), rurality of residence (rural versus urban), and, within the two cohorts
representing residents of long-term care facilities, facility type (assisted living facility;
custodial care facility; skilled nursing facility; or nursing facility), at the beneficiary
level. While we acknowledge that the effects of regional practice patterns and state-level
Medicaid policies beyond bed-hold policy quite likely healthcare expenditures in this
population, we lacked the statistical power to control for either Hospital Referral Region
or state.
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Analytical Approach
Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA on ranks tests (α = 0.05) assessed differences in
median per capita Medicare expenditures by cohort status, as well as by level of covariate
within each cohort. Modified Poisson regression models estimated the relative risk of
membership in the top 90th percentile or “high cost” group of Medicare beneficiaries,
among our four matched cohorts, as well as between the two cohorts representing
residents of long-term care facilities, respectively, with dual-eligible beneficiaries
residing in long-term care facilities as our referent. As our matching methodology had
already controlled for clinical indicators of frailty, number of chronic conditions,
Alzheimer’s/senility status, age, sex, and race/ethnicity, we did not control for these
covariates in the adjusted models. A separate analysis of these variables using modified
Poisson regression modeling confirmed that the inclusion of these matching variables as
control variables had no effect on other variables in the model. Finally, generalized linear
models estimated the associations between cohort status and estimated log-transformed
total Medicare expenditures per beneficiary. The statistical analyses were conducted
using SAS statistical software, version 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC). Approval from
the University of South Carolina Institutional Review Board was granted on March 24,
2016. The study was categorized as “exemption status,” as de-identified secondary data
was utilized for this study.
Results
Median per capita Medicare expenditures by cohort status are presented in Table
5.2. Unadjusted bivariate analyses detected significant differences in median per capita
Medicare expenditures across the four cohorts. Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in
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the community had the lowest median per capita Medicare expenditures, at $6,987, while
dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community had the highest, at $12,547. Median
per capita Medicare expenditures were higher for dual eligible beneficiaries residing in
long-term care facilities ($10,276) than they were for Medicare-only beneficiaries
residing in long-term care facilities ($8,953).
Characteristics associated with higher median per capita Medicare expenditures
across all cohorts were a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s or other form of senility and presence
of two or more chronic conditions. White beneficiaries had significantly higher median
per capita Medicare expenditures than did non-white or white, Hispanic beneficiaries, but
only among beneficiaries living in the community.
The degree to which beneficiaries fell into the “high cost” Medicare expenditures
group are presented in Table 5.3. Of note, more than 10% of beneficiaries were “high
cost” across all groups, which is to be expected given the high level of morbidity
documented in Table 5.1. The proportion of individuals in the “high cost” group was
highest among Medicare-only residents of long-term care facilities (31.93%), and lowest
among Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community (22.17%). Proportion of
beneficiaries in the “high cost” group were considerably higher among dual eligible
beneficiaries residing in the community (30.84%) as compared to dual eligible
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities (26.92%).
Rates of presence in the “high cost” group increased with age until age 81, then
declined, with a high of 31.87% among beneficiaries aged 76-80, and a low of 21.95%
among beneficiaries aged 91 and older. Both increased chronic condition numbers and
presence of an Alzheimer’s/senility diagnosis were associated with higher rates of
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presence in the “high cost” group in the bivariate analysis. Nearly 46% of residents of
skilled nursing facilities were in the “high cost” group, while only 12.07% of assisted
living facility residents were in the “high cost” group.
Adjusted Risk of Presence in the High Cost Medicare Expenditures Group
Multivariate modified Poisson regression modeling estimated the relative risk of
membership in the “high cost” group of Medicare beneficiaries in our study population.
In order to better elucidate the effects of the covariates on risk of being in the “high cost”
group, two analyses were performed: the first analysis included three models examining
the effects of cohort status, state Medicaid bed-hold policies, and rurality, successively,
among all four cohorts, (Table 5.4) while the second included four models examining the
effects of cohort status, state Medicaid bed-hold policies, rurality, and type of residential
facility, successively, among beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities (Table
5.5).
In the first analysis, Model 1 examined the risk of being “high cost” by cohort
status alone among all four cohorts, and found that the cohort of Medicare-only
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities had the highest risk (RR 1.19, p<.05)
when compared to the cohort of dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care
facilities, followed by the cohort of dual eligible beneficiaries who resided in the
community (RR 1.15, p <.05). The second and third models, which controlled
additionally for state bed-hold policies and state bed-hold policies as well as rurality,
respectively, had very little effect on risk of being “high cost” between the four study
cohorts, with the third model demonstrating a 19% higher risk for Medicare-only LTC
facility residents relative to dual eligible LTC facility residents (p <.05), and a 14%
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higher risk of PPH for dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community compared to
dual eligible LTC facility residents (p <.05).
The second analysis—which compared only the two cohorts representing
residents of LTC facilities—was similar to Models 1 through 3 in terms of relative risk
by cohort as well as by each covariate. However, the final model, Model 7, which
controlled for the additional variable of type of long-term care facility, demonstrated a
considerably higher relative risk of being “high cost” among Medicare-only LTC facility
residents relative to dual eligible LTC facility residents (RR 1.33, p <.0001). This final
model also showed a significantly higher risk of being “high cost” among residents of
nursing homes (skilled nursing facilities and nursing facilities), compared to residents of
assisted living facilities (RR 3.96 for residents of skilled nursing facilities, and RR 2.92
for residents of nursing facilities, p<.0001).
Total Expenditures Per Beneficiary
We performed two generalized linear models to examine actual Medicare
expenditures per beneficiary: the first examined log-transformed total Medicare
expenditures per beneficiary among the four study cohorts, adjusting for bed-hold
policies and rurality, while the second examined log-transformed total Medicare
expenditures per beneficiary between only the two cohorts representing residents of LTC
facilities, controlling for facility type in addition to bed-hold policies and rurality. In the
first model, actual total Medicare expenditures per beneficiary were significantly lower
for Medicare-only beneficiaries (both those who resided in the community, and those
who resided in residential long-term care facilities) as compared to dual eligible residents
of long-term care facilities, while urban beneficiaries had higher total Medicare

77

expenditures per beneficiary than did rural beneficiaries. However, in the second model,
while differences in total Medicare costs by rurality remained significant, differences in
total expenditures between Medicare-only and dual eligible long-term care residents were
no longer significant.
Discussion
Our findings suggest that the hypothesis on which this research was based—
namely, that more comprehensive long-term care would have a protective effect on health
care utilization, and thus Medicare spending—was incorrect. We found that residents of
skilled nursing facilities have a nearly four-fold risk of being “high cost” Medicare
beneficiaries, while residents of nursing facilities have a nearly three-fold risk, compared
to residents of assisted living facilities. Further research will examine the association
between type of long-term care facility and health care expenditures. It is likely that
residents of nursing facilities and skilled nursing facilities are sicker than residents of
assisted living and custodial care facilities in ways that we were unable to account for in
our matching methodology. It is also possible that residents of nursing and skilled nursing
facilities are at a higher risk of exposure to sicker individuals, given the proximity of
residents to one another and the potential for contagion as medical professionals move
from patient to patient.
The results of our study do suggest that dual eligible beneficiaries residing in
long-term care facilities are less costly to the Medicare system than dual eligible
beneficiaries residing in the community. Median expenditures among dual eligible
residents of long-term care facilities were $2,271 lower than median Medicare
expenditures among dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the community—a pattern that
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is borne out in the results of our Poisson regression analysis, with dual eligible
beneficiaries residing in the community at a 14% higher risk of being a “high cost”
Medicare beneficiary than dual eligible residents of long-term care facilities. It is possible
that, among dual eligible beneficiaries, comprehensiveness of care does indeed play a
role in preventing high-cost health care utilization. On the other hand, it is also possible
that total combined Medicare and Medicaid costs are higher for dual eligible beneficiaries
residing in long-term care facilities than for dual eligible beneficiaries residing in the
community—it will be important for further research to explore total costs to the system.
Medicare-only residents of long-term care facilities were found to have a 33%
higher risk of being a “high cost” Medicare beneficiary than dual eligible residents of
long-term care facilities, while Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community
are at an 18% lower risk of being “high cost” than are dual eligible residents of long-term
care facilities. However, the results of our generalized linear analysis demonstrate that, at
the median, Medicare-only beneficiaries have lower total Medicare expenditures per
capita than their dual-eligible counterparts who reside in long-term care facilities. That
Medicare-only long-term care facility residents have lower total per capita Medicare
expenditures than their dual eligible long-term care facility resident counterparts, yet are
at a 33% higher risk of being “high cost” Medicare beneficiaries is an important finding
that may suggest yet uncovered patterns of higher intensity medical care for Medicareonly residents of long-term care facilities than for their dual eligible counterparts. Given
that beneficiaries in each cohort are highly similar, these potential differential treatment
patterns would not likely be indicative of different levels of acuity. Further research will
examine what utilization patterns are associated with risks of being high cost, and

79

whether Medicare-only long-term care residents differ in patterns of total Medicare
utilization from their dual eligible counterparts.
Limitations
This study was limited by our relatively small sample size, which not only
prevented us from controlling for state of residence—which would have allowed us to
broadly measure the effects of Medicaid and other long-term care policies specific to
each state—but also from controlling for regional differences in practice patterns based
on Hospital Referral Regions. Our sample size of 4,384 also did not provide us with a
large enough sample to subset race or ethnicity by more than two levels.
Our study was also partially limited by our reliance, by necessity, on clinical
indicators of frailty to match members of the other three cohorts to the dual eligible
beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities. While we did have access to HCPCS
and CPT codes that indicated home use of oxygen, hospital beds, and mobility devices
among beneficiaries residing in the community, information as to the utilization of
oxygen, hospital beds, and mobility devices among beneficiaries residing in long-term
care facilities was not readily available. Information as to DME use among all cohort
members would have strengthened our study.
Finally, as we had access only to Medicare claims data, we did not have
information as to the home health or other supportive services paid for privately by either
Medicare-only or dual-eligible beneficiaries residing in the community.
Table 5.1: Characteristics of Study Cohorts, 2013 Medicare Claims Files, CMS

Total

Medicare
Only,
CommunityDwelling
1096

Medicare
Only, LTC
Resident
1096

80

Dual
Eligible,
Community
Dwelling
1096

Dual
Eligible,
LTC
Resident
1096

Percentage

100%

Sex
Male 346

346

346

346

31.6%

Female 750

750

750

750

68.4%

66-70 109

109

109

109

9.9%

71-75 119

119

119

119

10.9%

76-80 171

171

171

171

15.6%

81-85 244

244

244

244

22.3%

86-90 232

232

232

232

21.2%

91+ 221

221

221

221

20.2%

White, Non- 943

943

943

943

86.0%

Non-White, or 153
White, Hispanic
Rurality

153

153

153

14.0%

Urban 916

916

916

916

83.6%

Rural 180

180

180

180

16.4%

No 362

362

362

362

33.0%

Yes 734

734

734

734

67.0%

0 20

20

20

20

1.8%

1 126

126

126

126

11.5%

2+ 950

950

950

950

86.7%

Age Group

Race

Hispanic

Alzheimer’s/Senility

Chronic Condition
Number

Bed Hold Policy

81

No 409 (37.3%)

452

323 (29.5%)

(41.2%)
Yes 687 (62.7%)

644

(32.7%)
773 (70.5%)

(58.8%)
Type of Long-Term
Care Facility
None/Community 1096 (100%)
Resident
Assisted Living 0

738
(67.3%)

0

1096 (100%)

0

515

0

132

(47.0%)
Custodial Care 0

358

138

(12.0%)
0

64 (5.8%)

0

864

(12.6%)
Nursing Facility 0

405
(37.0%)

Skilled Nursing 0
Facility

38 (3.5%)

82

(78.8%)
0

36 (3.3%)

Table 5.2: Median Medicare Expenditures by Cohort, Medicare Claims Files, CMS * = p <.05; ** = p <.0001
Medicare Only,
CommunityDwelling (n =
1096)
$6,987

Dual Eligible,
LTC Resident (n
= 1096)

$8,953

Dual Eligible,
Community
Dwelling (n =
1096)
$12,547

Total (n =
4,384)

$10,276

P-Value
(Kruskal-Wallis),
for cohort
comparison
<.0001

Male $5,649

$8,576

$12,903

$10,123

<.0001

$9,601

Female $7,547

$9,623

$12,284

$10,297

<.0001

$10,186

66-70 $5,071

$7,386

$12,282

$14,341**

<.0001

$9,469

71-75 $6,524

$14,136

$13,935

$12,873

0.0037

$11,429

76-80 $7,886

$9,772

$13,462

$13,452

0.0005

$11,333

81-85 $7,622

$8,751

$14,370

$11,269

0.0001

$11,040

86-90 $7,355

$11,328

$12,088

$8,881

0.0023

$9,884

$7,877

$11,001

$6,660

0.0136

$7,781

Total

Medicare Only,
LTC Resident (n
= 1096)

$9,991

Sex

Age Group (d)
83

91+ $6,045
Race a, c

White, Non- $7,192*

$8,880

$12,836*

$10,293

<.0001

$10,267

$9,622

$9,629

$9,939

<.0001

$8,644

Urban $7,314

$10,115*

$12,811

$10,083

<.0001

$10,184

Rural $5,031

$5,688

$11,414

$11,092

<.0001

$9,421

$6,913*

$10,264**

$9,676*

<.0001

$7,748

$11,313

$14,218

$10,581

<.0001

$11,228

0 $1,225**

$2,209**

$2,720**

$4,254**

0.0373

$2,144

1 $1,909

$2,911

$4,133

$4,184

<.0001

$3,146

2+ $8,714

$11,437

$14,707

$11,710

<.0001

$11,793

Hispanic
Non-White, or $5,061
White,
Hispanic
Rurality b

84

Alzheimer’s/S
enility a, b, c,
d
No $4,731**
Yes $8,874
Chronic
Condition
Number
a,b,c,d

Bed

Hold

Policy
No $7,891

$8,423

$12,585

$10,620

0.0001

$9,911

Yes $6,577

$9,623

$12,462

$10,168

<.0001

$10,112

n/a

$12,547

n/a

<.0001

$10,078

$5,951**

n/a

$10,262

0.0167

$7,331

$14,277

n/a

$11,259

0.0866

$6,972

$10,976

n/a

$10,252

0.7238

$17,116

$23,968

n/a

$10,343

0.0040

$10,324

Type of LongTerm Care
Facility b
None/Commu $6,987
nity Resident
Assisted n/a
Living
Custodial Care n/a
85
Nursing n/a
Facility
Skilled n/a
Nursing
Facility

(a) indicates differences are significant within the Medicare-Only, Community-Dwelling group,
(b) indicates differences are significant within the Medicare-Only, LTC Resident group,
(c) indicates differences are significant within the Dual Eligible, Community-Dwelling group, and
(d) indicates differences are significant within the Dual Eligible, LTC Resident gro

Table 5.3. Factors associated with Costs in the 90th Percentile
(“High Cost”) Medicare Group, 2013 Medicare Claims File, CMS
% High Cost

p-value

Cohort
Medicare Only, Community- 22.17
Dwelling
Medicare Only, LTC Resident 31.93

<.0001

Dual Eligible, Community- 30.84
Dwelling
Dual Eligible, LTC Resident 26.92
Sex
Male 28.32

0.7195

Female 27.80
Age Group
66-70 27.29

<.0001

71-75 29.83
76-80 31.87
81-85 31.15
86-90 26.83
91+ 21.95
Race
White, Non-Hispanic 28.26

0.2791

Non-White, or White, Hispanic 26.14
Rurality
Urban 28.25
Rural 26.76
Alzheimer’s/Senility

86

0.3898

No 23.07

<.0001

Yes 30.38
Chronic Condition Number
0 3.75

<.0001

1 7.54
2+ 31.18
Bed Hold Policy
No 28.27

0.7365

Yes 27.80
Type of Long-Term Care Facility
Skilled Nursing Facility 45.70

<.0001

None (Community) 26.51
Assisted Living Facility 12.07
Custodial Care Facility 15.76
Nursing Facility 31.43

Table 5.4. Adjusted Relative Risk of Having Medicare Expenditures
in the 90th Percentile, All Cohorts, Medicare Claims Files, CMS,
*= p <.05; ** = p <.0001
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Medicare Only, Community- 0.82*
Dwelling
Medicare Only, LTC Resident 1.19*

0.82*

0.82*

1.18*

1.18*

Dual Eligible, Community- 1.15*
Dwelling
Dual Eligible, LTC Resident Ref

1.15*

1.14*

Ref

Ref

Cohort

Bed Hold Policy

87

No

Ref

Ref

Yes

0.98

0.98

Rurality
Urban

Ref

Rural

0.95

Table 5.5. Adjusted Relative Risk of Having Medicare Expenditures
in the 90th Percentile, Only Residents of LTC Facilities,
Medicare Claims Files, CMS, *= p <.05; ** = p <.0001
Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

1.19*

1.18*

1.33*

Ref

Ref

Ref

No

Ref

Ref

Ref

Yes

0.99

0.99

1.01

Urban

Ref

Ref

Rural

0.92

0.87

Cohort
Medicare Only, LTC Resident 1.19*
Dual Eligible, LTC Resident

Ref

Bed Hold Policy

Rurality

Facility Type
Assisted Living

Ref

Custodial Care

1.29

Skilled Nursing Facility

3.96**

Nursing Facility

2.92**

88

Table 5.6. Factors associated with Log-Transformed Total Medicare Expenditures Per
Capita, All Cohorts 2013 Medicare Claims Files, CMS
Parameter

β

SE

p-value

Intercept

9.1772

0.06

<.0001

-0.4537

0.06

<.0001

-0.1376

0.06

0.0146

0.0311

0.06

0.5790

Ref

Ref

Ref

No -0.0031

0.04

0.9410

Yes Ref

Ref

Ref

Urban 0.1413

0.05

0.0055

Rural Ref

Ref

Ref

Cohort Status
Medicare Only,
Community-Dwelling
Medicare Only, LTC
Resident
Dual Eligible,
Community-Dwelling
Dual Eligible, LTC
Resident
Bed-Hold Policy

Rurality

Table 5.7. Factors associated with Log-Transformed Total Medicare Expenditures Per
Capita, Only Residents of LTC Facilities, 2013 Medicare Claims Files, CMS
Parameter

β

SE

Intercept

8.7909

0.12

p-value

Cohort Status
Medicare Only, LTC -0.0451
Resident
Dual Eligible, LTC Ref
Resident
Bed-Hold Policy

0.06

0.4347

Ref

Ref

No -0.0406

0.06

0.4746
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Yes Ref

Ref

Ref

Urban 0.1866

0.07

0.0069

Rural Ref

Ref

Ref

Assisted Living -0.8216

0.14

<.0001

Custodial Care -0.6010

0.14

<.0001

Ref

Ref

0.11

0.0509

Rurality

Facility Type

Skilled Nursing Ref
Facility
Nursing Facility -0.2140

90

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
As the population of elderly Americans continues to increase, the U.S. healthcare
system will be faced with growing pressure not only to provide medical care that is costeffective, but to address issues—such as need for long-term care—that affect health
services utilization. This original dissertation research examined the interplay between
place of residence (community versus residential long-term care facility) and long-term
care payer type (private pay versus Medicaid) on Medicare-funded healthcare utilization
among elderly Medicare beneficiaries in need of long-term care services and supports.
Results presented in manuscripts one and two were based on analyses of 2013
Medicare claims data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
obtained from the Research Data Assistance Center (ResDac), merged with data from the
Area Health Resource File (AHRF). A retrospective cohort analysis was implemented to
examine differences in rates and risk of potentially preventable hospitalization (PPH), as
well as differences in Medicare expenditure patterns, between four matched cohorts:
Medicare-only beneficiaries residing in the community; Medicare-only beneficiaries
residing in long-term care facilities; Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries
residing in the community; and Medicare/Medicaid dual eligible beneficiaries residing in
long-term care facilities.
Regression analysis revealed a significantly higher risk of both PPH and having
Medicare expenditures in the top 90th percentile among both Medicare-only long-term
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care facility residents and dual eligible community residents as compared to dual eligible
long-term care facility residents. However, while there was no statistical difference in
median per capita Medicare expenditures between dual eligible community residents and
dual eligible long-term care facility residents, Medicare-only long-term care facility
residents had significantly lower per capita Medicare expenditures than did their dual
eligible counterparts residing in long-term care facilities. This finding that Medicare-only
residents of long-term care facilities are less expensive to the Medicare system, on
average, than their dual eligible long-term care facility resident peers, yet are more likely
to be hospitalized for a preventable condition and are more likely to be among the most
expensive Medicare beneficiaries, could indicate differential patterns of intensity of
medical response to similar clinical conditions between the two groups. Whether such
proposed differences in intensity could belie inappropriately low levels of response to
dual eligible beneficiaries, or inappropriately high levels of response to Medicare-only
beneficiaries will be the subject of future research.
Our study also found, contrary to the results of previous studies, that state
Medicaid bed hold policies had no statistically significant effect on either risk of PPH or
on Medicare expenditures. Indeed, the results of this study seem to indicate that perverse
incentives that have been suggested by a number of researchers to encourage
overutilization of Medicare-funded services for dual eligible beneficiaries—particularly
those dual eligible beneficiaries residing in long-term care facilities—may not play as
large of a role in Medicare-funded health system utilization, and that, in fact, some other
factor—or set of factors—encourages higher utilization among Medicare-only residents
of long-term care facilities. Further research will examine specific types of utilization of
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Medicare-funded health care, with a specific focus on types of PPH associated with
higher costs of care, and differences in patterns of these types of PPH between Medicareonly and dual eligible long-term care facility residents.
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